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THE HISTORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: A STUDY IN FORM
AND SUBSTANCE
William S. Blatt*
A history of statutory interpretation has yet to be written, either
for the civil or the common law.'
Max Radin's observation of 1942 remains true today. Although

the process of statutory interpretation has received considerable attention, its history has not. Courts and commentators generally view the
field as ahistorical, consisting of a few timeless rules.2
Perhaps this lack of appreciation is related to the modem consciousness of the tension between form and substance. Formal justice
is associated with rules that are based on ascertainable facts, restrain
official arbitrariness, and provide certainty. Substantive justice is associated with standards that direct courts to assess a particular fact
situation in terms of the overall objectives of the legal order. In the
modem consciousness, neither form nor substance emerges completely triumphant. Jurists shift from one mode to another depending

on the facts before them.3
The choice of form and substance is confronted whenever a court
encounters a statute. In the realm of statutory interpretation, formal
* B.A., 1978, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1982, Harvard University; member of the New
York and Washington, D.C. Bars. The author is associated with the firm of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius.
I would like to express my gratitude to Duncan Kennedy for his constant encouragement
in preparing this Article and to Judge Antonin Scalia for his thoughtful criticism, as well as to
Reed Dickerson, Mark Helm, James Kainen, Christine Littleton, Susan Nash, Roger Pies,
Vicki Schultz, Stephanie Seligman, and Paul Shechtman for their comments. The errors of the
Article remain mine alone.
I Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 424 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as Radin, Short Way].
2 For instance, the plain meaning rule, disavowed in 1940, United States v. American
Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1940), has reappeared in recent opinions of the federal
courts. See, e.g., Globe Seaways, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 509 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1975);
see Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation
in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1299 (1975). Likewise, the maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius ("mention of one thing implies exclusion of another thing") periodically disappears and reappears. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 813 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Statutory Interpretation].
3 See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685,
1701 (1976).
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justice is associated with following the letter of the statute and substantive justice with its "spirit." Conscious of this stark choice,4 modem thinkers see no historical pattern in statutory interpretation:
Throughout time, courts have either followed the statute or they have
not.
Nonetheless, the manner in which courts approach statutes has
developed over time. To appreciate that development, one must remember that the modem consciousness is just that: a product of a
particular era. The choice between formal rules and substantive standards has not always been so stark as it is today. Throughout history,
the choice has been perceived differently.
With that understanding, we can study the history of statutory
interpretation. To focus this history, this Article will trace a single
maxim: the "equity of a statute." Utilized by courts of law and equity alike,' the equity of a statute has been variously equated with
liberality, broad construction, legislative intent, judicial legislation,
analogical reasoning, and statutory purpose.6 Accordingly, this history will focus on cases that invoke the doctrine by name, interpret
"equitably," resort to the "equity," "reason," or "spirit" of statutes,
or which have otherwise been associated with the doctrine.
The history of the equity of a statute is the history of statutory
interpretation in microcosm. Lacking an established meaning, the
doctrine adopts its meaning from the surrounding legal universe. In
particular, the fluctuations in the meaning of the equity of a statute
illuminate two different levels in legal thought. The higher, more abstract level involves the relationship between common and statutory
law. When confronted by a statute, a court must initially decide
whether to handle the statute as it would the common law or to treat
it differently. On this plane, common and statutory law may be regarded either as essentially similar authorities, susceptible to the same
methods of judicial reasoning, or as intrinsically different materials
requiring disparate techniques. The lower, less abstract level is en4 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 14-15 (1984) (description of two basic styles of statutory interpretation) [hereinafter cited as
Easterbrook, Forward].
5 "The word equity, as used in the phrase 'Equity of a Statute,' is not to be confused with
the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery." Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 76, 76 (1909).
6 For authorities noting the breadth of meanings attributed to the equity of a statute, see,
e.g., R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 213-14 (1975) (comparing
,expansive and contractive sides of the doctrine); G. Endlich, A Commentary on the Interpretation of Statutes 436-50 (1888) (description of four types of equitable construction); see also
deSloovire, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 Cornell L.Q. 591, 605 (1936) ("reason of a
statute" described as meaning "many different things").
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countered once statutory and common law are acknowledged to be
different. At this point, jurists must organize the interpretive approaches to statutes, utilizing polarities such as strict and liberal interpretation or intent and plain meaning. Naturally, developments on
these two levels have been interrelated.
For purposes of this Article, the story of the equity of a statute in
America will be divided into five overlapping parts. These parts do
not represent rigidly drawn time frames but systems of thought, associated with, but not limited to, particular eras. 'The Article will start
with the relatively diffuse Blackstonian universe of the late eighteenth
century in which equity, coupled with law, operated as a grand principle applicable to common and statutory law alike.7 Equity was not,
however, consistently embodied in a single rule of interpretation.
The Blackstonian structure was modified during the preclassical
period of the early nineteenth century. The Blackstonian principles of
law and equity were replaced by technicality and liberality and the
interpretive rules were organized along the poles of strict and liberal
interpretation.
Next came the classical period of the mid-to-late nineteenth century, during which equity fell from preeminence and into disfavor.
The classical movement focused its attention on judicial legitimacy
and on legislative intent. This in turn sparked interest, in the tension
between literal and nonliteral interpretation. By the late classical era,
common and statutory law were polarized in the extreme.
The twentieth century witnessed movements which dismantled
the highly structured late nineteenth-century universe and resurrected
the equity of a statute. First, the Progressives paved the way for use
of the doctrine as an antecedent of analogical interpretation. Second,
the Legal Realists used it to argue against the determinacy of the old
order. Third, the post-Realists, and the legal process school in particular, awarded equitable construction a fixed place in a loose system
based upon statutory purpose.
Finally, the contemporary period is witnessing critical shifts in
the way courts regard statutes. Legislative purpose, long the guide to
statutory construction, is losing ground to approaches which harken
7 For descriptions of pre- 18th century views of the equity of a statute, see T. Plucknett, A
Concise History of the Common Law (1929); T. Plucknett, Statutes & Their Interpretation in
the First Half of the Fourteenth Century (1922); S. Thorne, A Discourse upon the Exposicion
& Understanding of Statutes (1942); Marcin, Epieikeia; Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 377 (1978); Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's
L. Rev. 202 (1936).
Case, 31 Ill.
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back to classical and preclassical periods. Jurists are once again using
rhetoric reminiscent of preclassical liberality and classical intent.
I.

THE BLACKSTONIAN VISION: EQUITY OF A STATUTE IN AN
UNDIFFERENTIATED LEGAL UNIVERSE

Compared to its successors, the late eighteenth century legal universe was loosely organized. The distance between common and statutory law was minimized by the use of transcending metaphors
applicable to common and statutory law alike. Blackstone's Commentaries contained the most complete elaboration of these metaphors. Blackstone believed that all judicial decisionmaking involved
the interplay between law and equity. In discussing the "Nature of
Laws in General," he described equity:
[It] is thus defined by Grotius, "the correction of that, wherein the
law (by reason of its universality) is deficient." For since in laws
all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary, that when
the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular
cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of excepting
those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator
himself would have excepted. 8
So understood, equity was not peculiarly applicable to the written law
enacted by Parliament or to the unwritten law discovered by common
law judges. Rather, it was a counterprinciple to law itself.
Equity thus depending, essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each individual case, there can be no established
rules and fixed precepts of equity laid down, without destroying it's
[sic] very essence, and reducing it to a positive law. And, on the
other hand, the liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light
must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and
leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the
judge. And law, without equity, tho' hard and disagreeable, is
much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law;
which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most
infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as many different
rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of
capacity and sentiment in the human mind.9
The overarching interplay between law and equity was also evidenced
in Blackstone's description of the "Laws of England," where, after
setting down the written and unwritten laws, he concluded: "These
are the several grounds of the laws of England: over and above which,
s 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *61.

9 Id. at 061-62.
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equity is also frequently called in to assist, to moderate, and to explain
"10

Though roughly parallel to form and substance, law and equity
to Blackstone contained little of the tension present in the modem
choice. Blackstone apparently did not see law and equity as incompatible, or if he did, was not troubled by their incompatibility. This
was because he was preoccupied by a concern peculiar to his times:
the division of justice in England between courts of law and equity.
At the time he wrote, the dual court system was the subject of intense
criticism because the result in a particular case depended upon the
forum in which the case was brought. Blackstone responded to this
criticism by emphasizing the essential unity of law and equity:
although the two fora differed procedurally, they employed one and
the same decisionmaking process." In thus rationalizing the English
system, Blackstone simply did not focus on the larger choice between
form and substance.
Blackstone's notion of equity as an overarching technique found
its way into America, persisting into the nineteenth century. Like
Blackstone, American jurists appealed to Grotius' definition of equity
as "the correction of that wherein the law (by reason of its universiality) is deficient."' 12 Several early American cases went further and
asserted the essential similarity of common and statutory law by demanding of statutes the same reasonableness required of the common
law. The South Carolina Superior Court in Ham v. M'Claws &
Wife, 13 said, "It is clear, that statutes passed against the plain and
obvious principles of common right, and common reason, are absolutely null and void."' 4 And in Bowman v. Middleton, 5 the same
court struck down a statute as "against the common right."' 6
10 Id. at *91-92.
'1 See Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1929);
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 209, 249-55
(1979).
12 Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361, 368-69 (1826); E. Smith, Commentaries on
Statute and Constitutional Law 817-18 (Albany 1848) (reliance on notion of equity as "correction of the law").
13 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 93 (1789).
'4 Id. at 98.
15 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252 (1792).
16 Id. at 254; see also Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 607 (1869) (acknowledgement that a Court might not follow a statute in "the scarcely supposable case where a
statute sets at nought the plainest precepts of morality and social obligation"). For a brief
arguing that statutes cannot violate the common right, see A. Hamilton, draft brief, I The Law
Practice of Alexander Hamilton 383 (J. Goebel ed. 1964) ("No statute shall be construed so as
to be inconvenient or against reason... [w]hen Statutes contradict the essential policy and
maxims of the common law the common law shall be preferred..."). For a discussion of the
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The legal universe of the late eighteenth century was also unorganized in that its rules of interpretation, including the equity of a
statute, were not highly systematized. Despite its stature as a universal principle, equity was not consistently embodied in any single rule
of interpretation. Blackstone associated it with several scattered, dis-

crete rules, applicable in differing circumstances. First, in his formulation of "equity" as the "reason and spirit" of the law, "equity" was
a "sign" of legislative intent, to be applied when statutory language
was ambiguous:
[T]he most universal and effectual way of discovering the true
meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering
the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator
to enact it. For whent 7this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it.

Later, in its incarnation as the rule in Heydon's Case," equitable interpretation became to Blackstone a principle peculiarly applicable to
remedial statutes:
There are three points to be considered in the construction of
all remedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy:
that is, how the common law stood at the making of the act; what
the mischief was, for which the common law did not provide; and
what remedy the parliament hath provided to cure this mischief.
And it is the business of the judges so to construe the act, as to
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.' 9
use of Dr. Bonham's Case in America, see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 30, 61-68 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Plucknett, Bonham's Case].
17 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at *61.
18 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584). In Heydon's Case, the Court of the Exchequer said:
[flor the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and considered:1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico.
Id. at 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638. The second step of this formula is known as the "mischief
rule." See infra text accompanying note 68.
19 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at 087.
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Finally, as the principle of Dr. Bonham's Case,20 equity was for Blackstone a means of avoiding unreasonable results. "[W]here some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be
unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this
consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they
are at liberty to expound the statute by equity ....
II.

A.

THE PRECLASSICAL PERIOD

Organization of the Law Along the Poles of Technicality and
Liberality: Equity as Liberality

The nineteenth century witnessed two overlapping movements
which reoriented the way courts approached statutes and hence the
meaning of the equity of a statute. The first, which I will call
"preclassical," emerging early and persisting late into the century,
was triggered by a shift in the fundamental polarity underlying law:
the replacement of the Blackstonian duality of law and equity with
technicality and liberality. Technicality was identified with professional techniques of reasoning and the old rules of pleading; liberality
with intuitive justice, modem law, and magnanimity. 22 The polar opposition of technicality to liberality pervaded the law 23 and early nineteenth-century thought generally.2"
Like law and equity, technicality and liberality roughly paralleled the choice between form and substance. Indeed, because they
were in tension, liberality and technicality more closely approximated
form and substance than did law and equity. Whereas equity and law
usually worked together in complimentary fashion to produce justice,
technicality and liberality were mutually exclusive.
Yet, the modem consciousness respecting form and substance
was still absent. Like Blackstone, preclassical jurists did not perceive
the tragic choice between form and substance: Liberality was clearly
20 College of Physician's (Dr. Bonham's) Case, 2 Brownl. 255, 123 Eng. Rep. 928 (C.P.
1609). Dr. Bonham's Case struck down on grounds of reasonableness a statute conferring on
the London College of Physicians the right to sanction physicians practicing medicine in
London without its certification.
21 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at "91.
22 See, e.g., 4 J. Kent, Commentaries lect. LIV, at *6-8, lect. LVI, at *116, lect. LVII, at
'158 (discussion of liberality and technicality in real-property law); cf. Conaughty v. Nichols,
42 N.Y. 83, 85-86 (1870) (court gives effect to "liberal" system of pleading under which deficiencies in "technical" language are not fatal).
23 For a more extensive discussion of liberality and technicality, see Mensch, The History
of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The Politics of Law 18, 21-22 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ; D.
Kennedy, C.L.T., 426-47 (unpublished manuscript on file at Harvard Law School Library).
24 See P. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War
143-55 (1965).
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the superior approach, incorporating the best of both. Also like
Blackstone, these jurists missed the problem of form and substance
because they were preoccupied by a particular historical problem: the
existence of archaic English law in America. When preclassical jurists spoke of technicality, they had in mind rules inherited from Eng25
land which were so arcane as not to provide certainty or restraint.
In such circumstances, liberality provided an easy choice.
As in the Blackstonian system, the existence of a transcending
polarity meant that similar reasoning applied to common and statutory law. In the preclassical system, common and statutory law alike
could be read liberally or technically. And, in the preclassical system,
the equity of a statute became associated with the grand principle of
liberality. For example, in White v. Carpenter,26 a New York judge
observed:
My judgment must be borne down by the force and weight of authority before I can attach to statut[ory] provisions a harsher operation or more unbending severity than to common law principles;
or deny to legislative enactments the liberal, benign and equitable
construction which will give to them the attributes of a nursing
27
mother, equally with the rules and principles of the common law.
B. Organization of the Rules of InterpretationAlong the Poles of
Strict and Liberal: Equity as Liberal Construction
The technicality/liberality duality was not only present on the
higher level of legal abstraction, standing above the distinction between common and statutory law, but was also replicated at the
lower, interpretive level, where it emerged as the choice between "liberal" and "strict" interpretation. At the lower level, the duality more
closely resembled the difficult choice between form and substance.
Archaic English law did not pose much of a problem for statutory
interpretation: by the nineteenth century, statutes were, by and large,
written in America and well-fitted to contemporary circumstances.
Consequently, literalism was no straw man-it sometimes represented certainty and restraint. The dilemma of form and substance
emerged; courts were faced with a hard choice between incompatible
goods.
The treatises of the period reveal the development of strict and
25 Cf. Commission on Practice and Pleadings, First Report 140-44 (Albany 1848) ("[S]o
unfit has [the technical system of pleading] been found, that in instances almost numberless,
the legislature and courts have departed from it.").
26 2 Paige Ch. 217 (N.Y. Ch. 1830).
27 Id. at 229.
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liberal categories. While Blackstone noted in passing that penal statutes shall be construed strictly2" and that remedial and antifraud statutes should be construed liberally, 29 he did not view the choice
between strict and liberal interpretation as exhaustive. By 1851, however, Bouvier did, dividing all interpretation into strict and liberal.30
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, the list of statutes given strict or liberal construction by courts lengthened considerably. Strict interpretation was given to penal statutes, 3 ' statutes
imposing taxes,32 statutes exempting from taxes,3 3 statutes against the
common right, 34 statutes of limitations, 35 statutes interfering with legitimate industries, 36 statutes creating liability, 3" statutes granting
power 3 and statutes in derogation of the common law, 39 among
others. Liberal construction was granted statutes exempting property
some statutes of limitations, 4 ' and remedial
from execution,'
statutes.42
The increased importance of the choice between strict and liberal
interpretation changed the meaning of "equity of a statute." Generally, the interpretive rules identified by Blackstone with the equity of
a statute, such as equity and the mischief rule, were absorbed into
liberal interpretation, 43 the type accorded remedial statutes. How1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at *88.
29 Id. at 088-89.
30 1 J. Bouvier, Institutes of American Law 40-43 (Philadelphia 1851).
3' Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 410 (1873); J. Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 349, at 438 (1891).
32 J. Sutherland, supra note 31, § 361, at 457.
33 Id. § 364, at 463.
34 Id. § 366, at 466; cf. Exparte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 307 (W.D. Ark. 1883) (strict construction of statutes in restraint of liberty).
35 J. Sutherland, supra note 31, § 368, at 468.
36 Id. § 370, at 471.
37 The Steamboat Ohio v. Stunt, 10 Ohio St. 582, 587-88 (1856); J. Sutherland, supra note
31, § 371, at 472.
38 Minturn v. Larue, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 435, 436 (1859); J. Sutherland, supra note 31,
28

§ 378, at 485.
39 People v. Buster, II Cal. 215, 221 (1858); J. Sutherland, supra note 31, § 400, at 510.
40 J. Sutherland, supra note 31, § 422, at 542.
41 Id. §§ 424-426, at 544-49.
42 Cullerton v. Mead, 22 Cal. 96, 98 (1863). Remedial statutes encompassed those for
"convenience of suitors," for "public convenience" in criminal prosecutions, for right of appeal, for protection of officers, for prevention of fraud, for withdrawal of penalties, for extension of the franchise, and for compensation for money taken. J. Sutherland, supra note 31,
§§ 409-413, at 522-24.
43 E.g., Simonton v. Barrell, 21 Wend. 362, 364 (N.Y. 1839) (cases interpreting remedial
acts described as employing "equity"); Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Loose, 19 Pa. 15, 18
(1852) ("Acts that give a remedy for a wrong done are to be taken equitably."); see Davis v.
Tarwater, 13 Ark. 52, 58 (1852) (mischief rule equated with liberal construction).
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ever, one rule identified by Blackstone with the equity of a statute
could not be absorbed into liberal interpretation. The rule of Dr.Bonham's Case and its contemporary equivalent, the maxim that statutes
against the common right were void, restricted statutes and were consequently aligned with strict construction. In so becoming, they lost
their affiliation with the equity of a statute. In Melody v. Reab,44 for
instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that statutes
against the common right were to be treated like penal statutes, i.e.,
they were "not to be extended by equitable principles." 4 Similarly, in
Shelby v. Guy, 6 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that
statutes against the common right did not generally receive equitable
construction. 7
III.

THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

Later in the nineteenth century and continuing into the early
twentieth, a second movement appeared. Jurists constructed the socalled "classical" order, in which contracts, property, and torts were
organized into the distinct categories familiar to us. Intent played a
critical role in this order. Concerned about their legitimacy, courts
began justifying their role by referring to the will of others. In private
law, this meant expanding the scope of private property, enforcing the
-will of the parties to a contract,
and limiting liability to situations in
48
fault.
at
was
actor
an
which
A.

The Rise of Legislative Intent: Equity Becomes Identified with
Reasoning Techniques Peculiarto Statutes
With respect to statutes, early classical thinkers settled on legislative intent, which joined the preclassical dichotomy of technicality
and liberality as a second, independent organizing principle for statutory interpretation. Like other early classical doctrines, legislative intent offered a middle ground between judicial activism and complete
44 4 Mass. 471 (1808).
45 Id. at 473 (1808).

24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361 (1826).
Id. at 368-69.
See, e.g., T. Parsons, The Law of Contracts (Boston 1855); see also M. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 201-07 (1977) (development of "will theory"
of contracts and mid-century emergence of rule permitting parties to contract out of common
law duties); id. at 85-99 (triumph of negligence standard); Vandevelde, The New Property of
the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 29 Buffalo L.
Rev. 325, 343, 352 (1980) (mid-century emergence of protection for trademarks and trade
secrets); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century:
The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1522-28 (1980)
(integration of rules of master-servant law into contract law).
46
47
48
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deference to the will of others, between unabashed paternalism and
unconditional nonintervention. The rise of intent was evident in
Kent's Commentaries. Whereas Blackstone concluded his account of
statutory interpretation by praising equity, Kent ended his by lauding
intent:
There are a number of other rules, of minor importance, relative to
the construction of statutes, and it will be sufficient to observe, generally, that the great object of the maxims of interpretation is, to
discover the true intention of the law; and whenever that intention
can be indubitably ascertained, and it be not a violation of constitutional right, the courts are bound to obey it, whatever may be their
opinion of its wisdom or policy.49
The ascendancy of legislative intent was evident in judicial opinions of
Kent's time. 50 Cases were replete with maxims such as:
A thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is
as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute, is not within the
statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers."'
Emphasis on the search for legislative intent sharpened the distinction between statutory and common law. When statutes were involved, courts felt constrained to divining legislative intent; when
statutes were not involved, they saw a wider range of options.
The rise of a concept limited to statutory law transformed the
equity of a statute. Generally, equity lost quality as a broad principal
with identical application throughout the law and became associated
with narrower methods of reasoning. With regard to statutes, equity
became a means of ascertaining legislative intent. Typical judicial
pronouncements of this period included: "[M]any cases, not expressly
named, may be comprehended within the equity of a statute; the letter
of which may be enlarged or restrained, according to the true intent of
the makers of the law;" 52 and "[a] thing within the letter of a statute,
is not within the law, unless it be within the intention of the makers;
and ...

a statute ought, sometimes, to have such equitable construc-

tion as is contrary to the letter."" Similarly, intent was equated with
J. Kent, supra note 22, lect. XX, at *468.
5o E.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 662 (1829) ("Every technical rule, as to
the construction or force of particular terms, must yield to the clear expression of the paramount will of the legislature.").
51 People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 381 (N.Y. 1818).
52 Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88, 92-93 (1817).
53 Bridgeport v. Hubbel, 5 Conn. 237, 244 (1824); see Hersha v. Brenneman, 6 Serg. &
Rawle 2, 3 (Pa. 1820) (equity described as having intended certain results); A. Hamilton, supra
note 16, at 392, 396 ("[T]o form a right judgment whether a case be within the equity of a
49 1
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two of Blackstone's alternative formulations of the equity docof the untrine 54-recourse to "reason and spirit"" and examination 56
derlying mischief that the statute was intended to remedy.
But one variety of equitable interpretation was not equated with
intent. Overtly intention thwarting, the rule in Dr. Bonham's Casethat the common reason controls statutes-could not be incorporated
into the canons of statutory interpretation. Unfashionable as a
method of statutory construction, 5 7 it was classified as a constitutional5" or common law precept.5 9
B.

Heightened Consciousness of the Tension Between Literal and
NonliteralInterpretation

The early classical emphasis on legislative intent resulted in a
heightened awareness of the tension between literal and nonliteral interpretation. Agreeing that their ultimate goal was to follow legislative intent, courts had to consider how to ascertain intent, and, in so
doing, had to choose between form and substance. The tension between literal and nonliteral interpretation formed the basis for a reorganization of the rules of statutory interpretation. Blackstone did not
focus on this tension. His five signs to be considered in interpreting
the will of the legislature were arranged in a hierarchy: "words,"
"context," "subject matter," "effects and consequence," and "reason
and spirit."' In nineteenth-century America, however, Blackstone's
signs were wrenched apart and set in opposition. In Tucker's Commentaries,6 1 for instance, the first two were pulled apart from the remaining three and embellished with a number of subrules governing
the interpretation of language. 62 Likewise, in Ryegate v. Town of
statute, it is a good way to suppose the law maker present, and that you asked him the question-did you intend to comprehend this case?").
54 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at '61, *87.
55 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-65 (1845); Lloyd v.
Urison, 2 N.J.L. 212, 217-18 (1807).
56 See Winslow v. Kimball, 25 Me. 493, 495 (1846); Richmondville Mfg. Co. v. Prall, 9
Conn. 487, 495 (1833).
57 See Plucknett, Bonham's Case, supra note 16, at 68.
58 See I H. St. G. Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 91 n.20 (Philadelphia 1803) (ban on
statutes against reason discussed in context of constitutional law); I J. Kent, supra note 22,
lect. XX, at *420 (Dr. Bonham's Case used as a prelude for discussion of constitutional law);
see also id. at *448-49 (Dr. Bonham's Case not applicable to America because of its constitutional system); Plucknett, Bonham's Case, supra note 16, at 67-68 ("written state constitutions" made Bonham rule unnecessary).
59 See I Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 3 (New Haven 1823).
60 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at "59-61.
61 H. St. G. Tucker, Commentaries on the Laws of Virginia (Winchester 1836).
62 1 id. at 12-15.
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Wardsboro,63 "context," "subject matter," "effects and consequence,"
and "reason and spirit" were lumped together in opposition to the
letter of the statute. 64
1. The Intent Resolution: Equity as Intent
Thus, in the nineteenth century, the tension between literal and
nonliteral interpretation gradually assumed paramount importance.
Courts sought to resolve this tension in one of three ways. The earliest, reaching maturity around 1830 and continuing into the early
twentieth century, utilized a nonliteral interpretation if consistent
with legislative intent. This intent resolution was expressed in the
maxim: Intent prevails over the letter.
[S]tatutes are not to be taken according to their very words, but
their provisions may be extended beyond, or restrained within the
words, according to the sense and meaning of the legislature apparent from the whole of the statute, or from other statutes enacted
before and after the one in question.63
Courts relying on this approach were favorably disposed toward equity. Intent was equated with "equity,, 66 "reason and spirit," 67 and
the mischief rule.68
63

30 Vt. 746 (1858).

6

Id. at 749.

Holbrook v. Holbrook, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 248, 254 (1822); Brown v. Wright, 13 N.J.L.
240, 242 (1832) ("[I]f from a view of the whole law,. . . the evident intention is different from
the literal import of the terms employed to express it ... , that intention should prevail, for
that in fact is the will of the legislature.") (citing United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
358, 399 (1805)); see Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 468, 475 (1869) ("It is a universal
rule in the exposition of statutes that the intent of the law, if it can be clearly ascertained, shall
prevail over the letter ..
"); see also Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
4 G. & J. 1, 157 (Md. 1832) ("If the question could now be put to the ... legislature...
whether they had . . . any such intention, it cannot be doubted what the answer would be.");
Commonwealth v. Cambridge, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 267, 271 (1838) ("[A] strict literal construction of the statute would be opposed to the intention of the legislature, and the true meaning of the act.
...
).
66 E.g., Haglin & Pope v. Rogers, 37 Ark. 491, 494-95 (1881); Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H.
393, 403, 419-20, 83 A. 916, 924 (1912); State v. People's Nat'l Bank, 75 N.H. 27, 31, 70 A.
542, 544 (1908); Hoguet v. Wallace, 28 N.J. 523, 525-26 (1860); Eshleman's Appeal, 24 Smith
42, 47 (N.Y. 1873).
67 E.g., Doles v. Hilton, 48 Ark. 305, 307-09, 3 S.W. 193, 194-95 (1887); Carrigan v.
Stillwell, 99 Me. 434, 437 (1905); In re Meyer, 209 N.Y. 386, 389, 103 N.E. 713, 714 (1913);
Chandler v. Northrop, 24 Barb. 129, 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857); State v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
61 W. Va. 367, 369, 56 S.E. 518, 519 (1907).
68 E.g., Gran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813, 825, 64 N.W. 245, 248 (1895); T. Sedgwick, A
Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law 235-36 (New York 1857).
65

812
2.
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The Plain Meaning Resolution: Equity as Judicial Legislation
The second judicial resolution of the tension between literal and

nonliteral interpretation, appearing somewhat later in the century,

was to follow statutory language if clear. 69 This resolution-that a
court should follow unambiguous statutory language, regardless of

the consequences--eventually became known as the plain meaning
rule. The plain meaning rule had a scientific air and echoed the socalled objective theories in contracts and torts. Like other "objective
theories," the plain meaning rule constituted an intermediate term be-

tween subjective intent of others-in this case the legislature-and the
equally subjective whim of the judiciary. Courts adopting this approach emphasized their duty to follow the will of the legislature

under the principle of separation of powers.
The plain meaning rule emerged slowly. The idea that the language of the statute controlled unless ambiguous was incompletely
articulated by Blackstone. His five signs of legislative intent were not
so organized. His first and third signs ("words" and "subject matter") were expressed without qualification,70 while his second and fifth
signs ("context" and "reason and spirit") applied only if the words
were "dubious,"'7 and his fourth sign ("effects and consequence") applied only if the words were absurd or bore no meaning.7 2
Mentioned periodically in the early nineteenth century,7 a the
plain meaning rule gained stature with the American publication of

the English Treatise, A General Treatiseon Statutes by Sir Fortunatus
Dwarris. 74 By the 1850's even courts ultimately going beyond the
words of the statute felt compelled to commence their analysis by

mentioning the plain meaning rule 75 and in 1857, Theodore Sedgwick
used plain meaning as the starting point of the first American treatise
69 United States v. Warner, 28 F. Cas. 404, 407 (C.C.D. Ohio 1848) (No. 16,643); United
States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 686 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113).
70 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 8, at *59-60.
71 Id. at '60-61.
72 Id. at *60.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96 (1820) ("The case must
be a strong one indeed, [to] justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of words
....
United
.);
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (where "the meaning of
the legislation be plain . . . it must be obeyed"); Putnam v. Longley, 28 Mass. (I
1 Pick.) 487,
490 (1831) ("[Wjhere the language is clear, and where of course the intent is manifest, the
Court is not at liberty to be governed by considerations of inconvenience."); Thaxter v. Jones,
4 Mass. 570, 574 (1808) ("[T]he language of the statute... is explicit, and no doubt can arise
in its construction.").
74 F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes (London 1830).
75 See, e.g., Ragland v. The Justices, 10 Ga. 65, 70 (1851) ("If the meaning was wholly free
from doubt, no interpretation would be admissible, for any construction variant from the clear
meaning of a Statute, would be judicial legislation."); Scaggs v. Baltimore & Wash. R.R., 10
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on statutory interpretation.7 6

Advocates of the plain meaning rule severely limited the scope of
equitable construction, condemning it as judicial legislation:
The power of extending the meaning of a statute beyond its words,
and deciding by the equity, and not the language, approaches so
near the power of legislation, that a wise judiciary will exercise it
with reluctance and only in extraordinary cases.
The legislature has prescribed certain arbitrary rules. . . . It
is not our province to inquire whether they are wise or unwise,
whether they operate equitably and beneficially or the reverse, but
whether each particular case comes within any of the rules
established.""

Accordingly, under the plain meaning rule, the equity of a statute
played no role in interpreting unambiguous statutes;7 8 recourse was
made to equity only if no plain meaning was evident. "[I]f the intention of the legislature be doubtful and not clear, a construction will be
that renders it most consonant to equity and least
put upon the statute
79
inconvenient."

3. The Absurdity Rule Resolution: Equity as a
Narrower of Statutes
The third resolution, emerging during the late classical period,

compromised between the other two. It afforded room to nonliteral
interpretation without abandoning the deference implicit in adherence
to language. Under the third approach, the court looked first to the
language of the statute but "[i]f a literal construction of the words of a
statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdMd. 268, 277 (1856) ("The words of the act are first to be resorted to, and if these are plain in
their import they ought to be followed.).
76 T. Sedgwick, supra note 68, at 231-32, 306-11.
77 Monson v. Chester, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 385, 387-89 (1839); see also United States v.
Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845) ("equitable construction of statutes" equated with
construction "beyond the just application of adjudicated cases"); Collins v. Carman, 5 Md.
503, 532 (1854) ("If the law makes no exception the courts can make none, whether they be
courts of law or equity.").
78 See, e.g., Bennett v. Worthington, 24 Ark. 487, 494 (1866) ("The correct rule, ...
is,
that where the will of the legislature is clearly expressed, the courts should adhere to the literal
expression of the enactment, without regard to consequences, and that every construction derived from a consideration of its reason and spirit should be discarded."); Hyatt v. Taylor, 42
N.Y. 258, 262 (1869) ("Much has been loosely said of the duty of courts to give an equitable
construction to statutes according to their 'spirit,' but there is no sufficient warrant for an
appeal from legislative to judicial discretion on such mere ground of convenience."); Davidson
v. McCandlish & Son, 69 Pa. 169, 172-73 (1871) (claim dismissed as "not within the letter of
the act, but only its equity").
79 Thomas' Election, 198 Pa. 546, 550, 48 A. 489, 490 (1901); see Mundt v. Sheboygan &
F. du L. R.R., 31 Wis. 451, 457-58 (1872).
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ity. '' ° This approach, known as the "golden rule" in England, 1 was
adopted by only a minority of American courts. In America, the
golden rule was most often described as a presumption against
absurdity.82
Under the absurdity resolution, equitable interpretation was
solely a narrower of statutes. Utilized when following plain meaning
would lead to an absurd result, 3 the equity of a statute functioned
only to remove cases from otherwise applicable statutes. The anonymous Note On Construing Statutes by Equity8 4 was the first authority
explicitly limiting equitable construction in this manner. That Note
distinguished between equity that enlarged the scope of a statute and
equity that restricted a statute, defending the latter because:
All men, knowing what it is they do contemplate, are apt to use
words which are large enough to embrace it; but all men, being
unconscious necessarily of what they do not contemplate, are liable

to employ general words that (literally taken) have a sense more
comprehensive than is suited to their present design.8 5

Restrictive equity surfaced in several opinions in the second half
of the nineteenth century. 6 In the famous Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States,87 holding a statute prohibiting the employment of
80 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
81 Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. Toronto L.J. 286,

299 (1935); see generally id. at 286-300 (history of "golden rule" in England).
82 See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 607, 609 (1869); Hasson v. City of
Chester, 67 W. Va. 278, 282-83, 67 S.E. 731, 733-34 (1910); J. Bishop, Commentaries on the
Written Laws § 82, at 65-66 (1882); H. Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws §§ 46-49, 100-07 (1896); G. Endlich, supra note 6, §§ 245-266, at 324-54; J.
Sutherland, supra note 31, § 332, at 419.
83 Equity was equated with the presumption against absurdity, see State v. Comptoir National D'Escompte de Paris, 51 La. Ann. 1272, 1281, 26 So. 91, 95 (1899) (" '[I]t is legitimate,
if two constructions are fairly possible, to adopt that one which equity would favor.' ") (quoting Washington & I.R.R. v. Coeur D'Alene Ry. & Navigation, 160 U.S. 77, 101 (1895)); De
Paige v. Douglas, 234 Mo. 78, 89, 136 S.W. 345, 348 (1911) ("'When ambiguities or faults of
expression render the meaning of the law doubtful, that interpretation should be preferred
which is most consonant to equity ....
') (quoting Edward Coke); Thomas' Election, 198
Pa. 546, 550, 48 A. 489, 490 (1901); Turbett Twp. Overseers v. Port Royal Borough Overseers,
33 Pa. Super. 520, 524 (1907); Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 W. Va. 278, 281-83, 67 S.E. 731,
733 (1910); and the absurdity rule proper, see, e.g., People ex rel. Twenty-Third St. R.R. v.
Commissioners of Taxes, 95 N.Y. 554, 557-59 (1884).
84 3 Q.L.J. 150 (1858).
85 Id. at 152.

86 See, e.g., Smiley v. Sampson, I Neb. 56, 84-88, aff'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 91 (1871); Pettit
v. Fretz's Exec., 33 Pa. 118, 120-21 (1859); see also H. Black, supra note 82, §§ 29-30, at 66
("[C]ourts have power to declare that a case which falls within the letter of a statute is not
governed by the statute, because it is not within the spirit and reason of the law and the plain
intention of the legislature.").
87 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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foreigners inapplicable to a contract between a church and its parson,
the United States Supreme Court split in half the common maxim
when it declared "that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers, '8 8 without conceding that spirit could be
used to widen the scope of a statute. In Perry v. Strawbridge,8 9 the
Supreme Court of Missouri relied upon a similar maxim in holding
that a husband who murdered his wife could not inherit from her
estate under an intestacy statute. 9°
C.

Extreme Polarizationof Common and Statutory Law: The
Decline of Equity

Thus, in the nineteenth century, two sets of principles for interpreting statutes had emerged. One was based on the classical notion
of legislative intent and organized interpretive rules along the tension
between literal and nonliteral interpretation, ultimately settling on intent, plain meaning, or the "golden rule." The other utilized the
preclassical duality of technicality and liberality and divided its interpretive rules along the choice between strict or liberal interpretation.
On the lower, interpretive level, the rules underlying these
schemes were compatible. Courts felt comfortable invoking both literal/nonliteral and strict/liberal rhetoric in a single opinion. The
strict/liberal dichotomy was used with both intent and plain meaning
resolutions. When courts chose intent over letter, the remedial purpose for the statute provided additional reason for interpreting it in
accordance with equity; 9 when they operated within the plain meaning regime, the rule that remedial statutes are construed broadly was
invoked where ambiguity existed. As one court said: "It being a remedial statute and its construction in doubt, we think we are at liberty
to construe it liberally for the advancement of the remedy and supres92
sion of the mischief aimed at by the legislature.
Despite such integrations at the level of the rules of interpretation, preclassical and classical modes were fundamentally incompatible on the abstract level of the relationship of statutory and common
88 Id. at 459. Compare this with the original formulation of the rule, supra text accompanying note 51.
89 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
90 Id. at 638-39, 108 S.W. 645-46 (citing H. Black, supra note 82).
91 See, e.g., Haglin & Pope v. Rogers, 37 Ark. 491, 496 (1881); Maysville & L.R.R. v.
Herrick, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 122, 125 (1877).
92 Mundt v. Sheboygan & F. du L. R.R., 31 Wis. 451, 460 (1872); see McNair v. Williams,
28 Ark. 200, 206-07 (1873) (quoting F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes 562, 614, 667
(Potter ed. Albany 1871)); T. Sedgwick, supra note 68, at 311-12.
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law. Courts argued violently over whether to assign primacy to liberality or plain meaning. For instance, in deciding whether a statute
permitting the assignment of indentured servants on the consent of
the apprentice "or" his parent should be read to require the permission of both, the court in Commonwealth ex rel. Stephenson v.
Vanlear9 3 split as much over the proper attitude to be taken toward

statutes as it did over result. Justice Brackenridge, in dissent, relied
on "liberality" rhetoric. He favored a "liberal" construction that
would look to the "reason" of the law and require consent of both
apprentice and parent.94 The two other judges, in opting for plain
meaning, rejected this rhetoric. Chief Justice Tilghman, writing for

the majority, said that the language should prevail even when contrary to the probable intent: "The law would have been better, if it
had been and instead of or, and very probably it was so intended. But
I dare not take the liberty of altering what is written." 95 Justice
Yeats, also dissenting, went further:
It is said here, that or must be construed and, the consent of the
parent being necessary. But this appears to me, to be the assumption of an unwarrantable liberty over the expressions of the legislature, by changing its provisions. Such a deviation could only be
warranted, in a clear case, to effectuate the plain meaning of a
law.9 6
Another opinion expressing violent disagreement over the choice between liberality and plain meaning was Strawbridge v. Mann,9 where
a majority of the Georgia Supreme Court relied upon equitable construction, 98 but the author of the opinion felt compelled to express his

personal preference for using plain meaning to reach the same
result. 99
93 1 Serg. & Rawle 248 (Pa. 1815).
94 Id. at 253 (Brackenridge, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 250.
96 Id. at 251-52 (Yeates, J., dissenting).
97. 17 Ga. 454 (1855). Mann interpreted a statute limiting the time for execution of judg-

ment to seven years.
98 This Statute. . .is one of those to which this Court has applied the principle of
equitable interpretation. That principle is one which makes a Statute include a
case which, though not within the words of the Statute, is within the mischief
aimed at by the Statute; or exclude a case, which though within the the words, is
not within the mischief.
Id. at 456.
99 Id. at 458-59. The author wrote:
But as a general thing, with respect to Acts of our own Legislature, I should
feel myself rigorously bound down to the words. The words of those Acts are,
what the great majority of the people of the State shape their actions by. It is the
words only, that are published to them-and when, after they have followed the
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Such split decisions disappeared in the late classical period. In
the midst of a furious systematization of the rules of statutory inter-

pretation, 1° courts ceased believing in methods of reasoning capable
of bridging the gap between statutory and common law. This cession
may have been related to the fact that liberality no longer afforded an
easy resolution to the problem of form and substance. By the late
nineteenth century, technical English rules had largely been eliminated."° ' Technicality could no longer be used as a straw man; to
have any content, it would have had to have represented "form," with
the corresponding advantages of certainty and restraint. In that context, to frame judicial inquiry around the decision between liberality
and technicality would simply be to organize it around an inevitable,
tragic choice.
Courts decided not to frame their inquiry around this choice, but
instead focused on the problem of judicial authority. They sought to
legitimize judicial authority by separating law from politics. They
performed this separation by distinguishing between public and private spheres; public was associated with politics while private became
identified with law. Evidenced in numerous treatises published late in
the century, 0 2 the growth of the public/private distinction was linked
to the wrenching apart of common and statutory law. Common law
became identified with private orderings; 0 3 statutory law, with public
intervention into those orderings.1°
The classical reordering proved so successful that alternative
words of the law, they are told by the Courts that they have not followed the law,
they feel, that for them, the law has been turned into a snare.
100 Treatises and jurisprudential works on statutory interpretation proliferated during this
period. See supra note 82. Nor was the interest in statutory interpretation limited to these
works. Contract and constitutional law scholars consciously modeled their theories of interpretation after those developed for statutes. See, e.g., T. Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union
69-101 (6th ed. 1890) (importing rules of statutory construction into interpretation of state
constitutions).
101 See, e.g., 1848 N.Y. Laws c. 379 (commonly known as the "Field Code"); see Commission on Practice and Pleadings, First Report 73-74 (Albany 1848).
102 See, e.g., J. Bishop, The Doctrines of the Law of Contracts (1878); J. Hare, The Law of
Contracts (1887); J. Perry, A Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees (1871); J. Pomeroy,
A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence (1881); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws or
Private International Law (1872); see also Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, 1423-26 (1982) (describing the growth of the public/private
distinction). See generally G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 68-98 (1977) (description
of the Age of Anxiety); Mensch, supra note 23, at 23-26 (discussion of classical distinction
between private and public law).
103 Private law consisted of commercial law, contracts, property, torts, and trusts and estates. See Horwitz, supra note 102, at 1424.
104 Public law consisted of constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law. Id.
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modes of thought became inconceivable. The notion of reasoning
techniques, such as liberality, which were applicable to both common

and statutory law, became meaningless. The fall of liberality was evident in two developments. One was the rise to prominence of the
maxim: Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly
construed. That maxim was only imperfectly formulated before the
mid-nineteenth century.'0 5 In the passage popularly credited as its
first appearance, 10 6 Kent said:
Statutes are ... to be construed in reference to the principles of
the common law; for it is not to be presumed that the legislature
intended to make any innovation upon the common law, further
than the case absolutely required. . . . It was observed by the
judges, in the case of Stowell v. Zouch, that it was good for the
expositors of a statute to approach as near as they could to the
reason of the common law; and the resolution of the barons of the
exchequer, in Heydon's case was to this effect.'0 7
This passage probably meant nothing more than the principle that
statutes should be read to accord with the common reason, a principle
often equated with Stowell v. Zouch. "8 "The maxim statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed was not so
phrased until 1854, and was not popular until late century."'" The
very formulation of that maxim revealed a fundamental shift in attitude. Statutes were no longer part of the same fabric as the common
law but were antagonistic to it. Derived from different sources, they
comprised an alien body of law.
105 See, e.g., Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 365, 367 (1797); see also Pound, The Common
Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 400-01 & n.4 (1908) (collecting earlier versions of
the maxim) [hereinafter cited as Pound, Common Law].
106 Pound, Common Law, supra note 105, at 400 n.4.
107 1 J.Kent, supra note 22, lect. XX, at *464 (footnotes omitted).
108 1 Plowd. 353, 365, 75 Eng. Rep. 536, 554 (K.B. 1797).
This is evident when one compares Kent with his contemporary, Nathaniel Dane. Dane,
too, made statements like "[s]tatutes are to be expounded by the rules and reasons of the
common law," 6 N. Dane, Digest of American Law 588 (Boston 1824); "[t]he common law is
to be regarded in the construction of statutes," id. at 598; "an obscure statute ought to be
construed according to the rules of the common law," id. at 589; and "[t]he principles of the
common law govern in the construction of private statutes," id. at 590. Sometimes these statements were used to narrow statutes contrary to the common law. See id. at 589 ("Statutes are
not presumed to alter the common law otherwise than is clearly expressed .. ");id. at 597
("[A] statute shall not have an equitable, liberal, or enlarged construction, so as to take away a
common law remedy ....")at other times they broadened the statute. Id. at 587 ("When a
statute creates a new right, without prescribing a remedy, the common law will furnish an
adequate remedy to give effect to the statut[ory] right."). Thus, their net effect was neutral.
Id. at 598 ("The common law is to be regarded in the construction of statutes. This is a good
general rule; but it embraces too many considerations to be of much use.").
109 Pound, Common Law, supra note 105, at 401-02.
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A second development demonstrating the collapse of any bridge
between common and statutory law-and of liberality in particularwas the fate of the California Civil Code. When proposed in the
1860's, its advocates saw no difference in the elaboration of statutory
and common law. David Dudley Field, the author of the Code,
thought it could be read broadly and at the same time as an extension
of the common law:
[I]f there be any rule of the common law not mentioned in the
Code, it will continue to exist as it was before; while if a new case
arises, not forseen and therefore not provided for, it will be decided, as it would now be decided, by analogy to a rule expressed in
the Code, or to a rule omitted, and therefore still existing outside of
the Code, or by the dictates of natural justice. "°
As adopted in 1872, the Code embodied Field's vision. Section 4 required the Code to be "liberally construed with a view to effect its
objects and to promote justice,"I" while section 5 required that its
provisions, "so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes or the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof,
'' 1
and not as new enactments." 2
By the 1880's, however, the notion of a single approach to common law and statutes had lost meaning. Lawyers could no longer
conceive of a liberally construed Code that simultaneously continued
the common law. Professor Pomeroy was the first to criticize the interpretive section of the Code.' '3 He saw "antagonism, conflict and
contradiction.

. .

between the special and particular rules derived by

judicial decision from the doctrines formulated in the code, and those
contained in decisions based solely upon the authority of common law
and equity doctrines and rules still left in operation outside of the
code.,"1 4 He claimed that:

The common law as a form of jurisprudence possesses certain
peculiar excellencies, acknowledged by all able jurists to belong to
it in the highest degree, which constitute its essential characteris110 D. Field, The Code of New York, in I Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous Papers
of David Dudley Field 338, 347 (A. Sprague ed. 1884); see id. at 329.
111 Cal. Civ. Code § 4 (West 1982).
112 Cal. Civ. Code § 5 (West 1982). See generally Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.-A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California Civil Code, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 1,12-18 (1977)
(description of the history of the interpretation of the California Civil Code); Harrison, The
First Half-Century of the California Civil Code, 10 Calif. L. Rev. 185, 188-93 (1922) (discussion of judicial interpretation of the Code); Van Alstyne, The California Civil Code, in Calif.
Civ. Code Ann. 1, 29-36 (West 1954) ("Judicial Development of the Civil Code").
113 Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil Code (pts. 1-8), 3 W. Coast Rep.
585, 657, 691, 717; 4 W. Coast Rep. 1, 49, 109, 145 (1884).
114 Pomeroy, supra note 113, 4 W. Coast Rep., at 148.
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tics, and which render it, in those respects, superior to any other
form of municipal law in its adaptability to the needs of a progressive society. . . .The distinguishing element of the common law,
and one of its highest excellencies, is its elasticity, its power of natural growth and orderly expansion. Its doctrines, however formulated, are not limited to any fixed, existing condition of facts, but
they may, by virtue of their own inherent power, be extended to
new facts and circumstances, as these are constantly arising in the
intercourse of men and transactions of life." 5
In contrast, "[t]he peculiarity of statutes. . . is their rigidity. Statutory rules once enacted cannot be readily modified and expanded by
the courts so as to cover new facts and relations not included within
their expressed terms."' 1 6 As embodied in the Code they were "incomplete, imperfect, and partial."'" 17 Read literally, the Code would
"become a mass of uncertainties, inconsistencies, and contradictions."' 18 It "substituted new and unknown words and phrases in the
place of those legal terms and expressions which have hitherto been
generally employed by writers and judges, which are familiar to the
profession, and the meaning of which are fixed and certain." ' 19 For
instance, it was "almost impossible to conceive that the authors of the
code intended to have the common law rules in full operation in all
instances of lapsed legacies, and to change them only in some instances of lapsed devises."' 12 0 Likewise, the section on fraud was
poorly drawn because it ignored the distinction between law and equity.' 2 ' Such sections would "give the courts great difficulty in...
interpretation, unless the judges are willing to boldly legislate, and
add language to it which cannot possibly be found in it.' ' 122 Pomeroy
felt that the only way to avoid such a result was to rely heavily on the
common law. Code provisions should "be regarded as simply declaratory of the previous common law and equitable doctrines and rules,
except where the intent to depart from those doctrines and
rules
' 23
clearly appears from the unequivocal language of the text."'
Pomeroy's views were adopted by the California Supreme Court
24
in Sharon v. Sharon: 1
115 Id.
116 Id.

117
118
119
120
121
122
123

at 110.
at 110-11.

Id. at 114.
Pomeroy, supra
Id. at 659.
Id. at 590.
Pomeroy, supra
Pomeroy, supra
Pomeroy, supra

note 113, 3 W. Coast Rep. at 585.

note 113, 4 W. Coast Rep. at 2.
note 113, 3 W. Coast Rep. at 589.
note 113, 4 W. Coast Rep. at 152.

124 75 Cal. 1, 16 P. 345 (1888).
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The common law underlies all our legislation, and furnishes
the rule of decision except in so far as the statutes have changed
the common law. When the common law is departed from by a
provision of the code, effect is to be given to the provision to the

extent-and only to the extent-of the departure. 2 5

After Sharon, the California Code lost its flavor and became "immersed in the sea of common law."' 26
The extreme polarization of common and statutory law contributed to the demise of the equity of a statute. Advocates of plain
meaning were most hostile to the doctrine. Dwarris had disdain for
it,' 2 7 and although Sedgwick reluctantly gave equitable interpretation
129
a place in his system, 128 later proponents of plain meaning did not.
But the attack on equitable construction was not confined to proponents of plain meaning. The term "equity," as distinct from terms
such as "spirit" and "reason," connoted a principle with general application throughout the law. While such a notion was meaningful to
lawyers familiar with "liberality," it was useless to those who looked
solely to legislative intent. Therefore, courts using the intent ap13
proach began to discard "equity" for terms like "general purpose" 0
and "policy of law."' 13 1 Similarly, authorities relying on the golden
rule-that statutes should be construed to avoid absurdity-shied
1 32
away from "equity of a statute" in favor of "reason" and "spirit."'
Henry Black, for instance, after observing that courts had disavowed
the power to use expansive equitable interpretation, 33 defended the
use of spirit only as a narrower of statutes:
[A] statute . . .should be construed according to its spirit and
reason ....
• . . [And] the courts have power to declare that a case which
Id. at 28, 16 P. at 357.
Englard, supra note 112, at 15.
127 He stated: "It is too general a ground to put cases upon statutes where things shall be
taken by equity ...." F. Dwarris, supra note 74, at 720-21, and "'there is always danger in
giving effect to what is called the equity of a statute; it is much safer and better to rely on and
abide by the plain words,' " id. at 721 (quoting Lord Tenterden). Dwarris also condemned
judges for abrogating to themselves "the lofty privilege of correcting abuses and introducing
improvements" in the laws, id. at 792, and attacked "equitable interference" on their part, id.
at 793.
128 T. Sedgwick, supra note 68, at 362-63.
129 See, e.g., G. Endlich, supra note 6, § 325, at 446-47; J.Sutherland, supra note 31,
§§ 413-414, at 524-30.
130 See, e.g., State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 518, 126 N.W. 454, 455 (1910).
131 See Tompkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 18 N.Y.S. 234, 236 (1892).
132 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-61 (1892), where the
Supreme Court relied on "reason and spirit" without mentioning "equity."
133 H. Black, supra note 82, § 28, at 63-65.
125

126
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falls within the letter of a statute is not governed by the statute,
because it is not within the spirit34and reason of the law and the
plain intention of the legislature. 1
35
The bias against "equity" was also evident in Perry v. Strawbridge.'
Though well aware of the famous Riggs v. Palmer,136 where the New
York Court of Appeals had reached the same result by reliance on
equity, 137 Judge Graves tried to make his decision more palatable by
rejecting "equity" in favor of "spirit and reason."' 38 Likewise, those
39
relying on liberal construction drew upon "equity" less frequently.'
Thus, the overwhelming opinion of late classical lawyers was that
the equity of a statute was dead.' 4 The treatises announced that it
was no longer to be followed. Endlich devoted thirteen pages to demonstrating how the doctrine "would not be tolerated now,"' 4 ' had
"fallen into discredit,"' 42 and was "a beacon to be avoided."' ' 43 Sutherland described it as a historical doctrine whose "underlying principle is obsolete."'" Henry Black took a similar approach: "The power
to make such constructions is now disavowed by the courts."' 4 Even
brief accounts of the rules of interpretation made certain to mention
that the equity of a statute was no longer followed.14 6 Case law con134 Id. §§ 29-30, at 66.
13 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
136 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (cited in Perry, 209 Mo. at 633-35, 108 S.W. at 644).
137 115 N.Y. at 510-11, 22 N.E. at 189. Both Perry and Riggs considered whether a murderer could inherit from his victim.
138 209 Mo. at 636-41, 108 S.W. at 645-46.
139 Compare T. Sedgwick, supra note 68, 362-64 (equity of a statute equated with liberal
construction), with H. Black, supra note 82, §§ 29-30. at 66, 67 (liberal construction equated
with "spirit and reason"), and J. Sutherland, supra note 31, §§ 412-415, at 524-31 (liberal
construction distinguished from equitable construction). The rule in Heydon's Case, 3 Co.
Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584), was not attacked during this period. H. Black, supra note
82, § 91, at 286. G. Endlich, supra note 6, at §§ 27, 35, 103, 135, 337, 466; see T. Sedgwick,
supra note 68, 235-36; J. Sutherland, supra note 31, § 162, at 217 n.3, § 207, at 274 n.I, § 300,
at 383 n.3.
140 The demise of "equitable interpretation" in the 1880's coincided with a renunciation of
the common law power of courts to declare criminal statutes obsolete from desuetude. See
Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 389, 428-29
(1964) (renunciation of desuetude in Pennsylvania and Iowa in the 1880's).
141 G. Endlich, supra note 6, § 323, at 443.
142 Id. § 325, at 446.
143 Id. § 328, at 449.
144 J. Sutherland, supra note 31, § 414, at 529. See id. § 413, at 525 (equitable interpretations described as "relics of ancient hermeneutics which do not survive entire").
145 H. Black, supra note 82, § 28, at 57.
146 See Rood, Interpretation of Statutes, 8 Mod. Am. L. 423, 433 (1914). For another example, in the third edition of F. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics (St. Louis 1880) (1st
ed. Boston 1839), William Hammond added a six page supplemental note criticizing equitable
interpretion, a doctrine not discussed in the original. Id. at 283-89.
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curred in this judgment. 47 For instance, Encking v. Simmons 48 announced that the doctrine ' of49 equitable construction, "if it ever existed,
was long since exploded."'
IV. THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY REVIVAL OF EQUITY
Despite the declarations of classical jurists, the equity of a statute
was not really dead. Although discredited, it was ultimately revived
in three twentieth-century movements.
A.

The Progressives and Their Successors: Equity
as Analogical Interpretation

The earliest impulse toward a revival came from legal reformers
known as the Progressives-men such as Ernst Freund, John Chipman Gray, and Roscoe Pound. The Progressives held two views with
respect to statutory interpretation. First, they believed in the unitary
nature of common law elaboration and statutory interpretation:
The judge must legislate, and selective interpretation is legislation. .

.

. The spectre of judicial usurpation conjured up in the

minds of those who dread judicial legislation in every form, and
would like to restrict the courts to purely administrative functions,
will never vanish. Selective interpretation is a necessity of every
system in which the judiciary is clothed with any authority."50
In the same vein, Ernst Freund noted that legislative intent was often
147 See, e.g., State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 518, 126 N.W. 454, 455 (1910) ("The term
'equity of a statute' has fallen into disuse."); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 638, 108 S.W.
641, 645 (1908) ("[T]he old idea of equitable construction of statutes is no longer recognized
by the courts.
...
); State ex rel. Woodside v. Woodside, 112 Mo. App. 451, 453, 87 S.W. 8,
9 (1905) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable interpretation has been abandoned."); State ex rel. Graham v. Bratton, 90 Neb. 382, 385, 133 N.W. 429, 431 (1911) ("[I]t is not within our power to
set aside or amend by construction an act of the legislature which is free from all ambiguity
and clear and explicit in its terms, simply because to do so would appear to be equitable.");
Tompkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 18 N.Y.S. 234, 236 (1892) ("[T]here is no more dangerous rule
than that of equitable construction . . . . [T]he tendency in these days has been to abandon
the so-called equitable construction." (citation omitted)); Saville v. Virginia Ry. & Power, 114
Va. 444, 452, 76 S.E. 954, 957 (1913) ("We hear a great deal about the spirit of the law, but the
duty of this court is not to make law, but to construe it."); Walker v. City of Spokane, 62
Wash. 312, 318, 113 P. 775, 777 (1911) ("[W]hile equitable construction may be tolerated in
remedial statutes, it should always be resorted to with great caution, and never extended to
mere arbitrary regulations of matters of public policy."); Mellen Lumber Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 154 Wis. 114, 119, 142 N.W. 187, 189 (1913) ("It was at one time urged that the
courts might mitigate the rigor of harsh statutes by adopting a rule of equitable construction
... .It never obtained in this state, nor to any considerable extent in this country.").
148 28 Wis. 272 (1871).
149 Id. at 276.
150 Spencer, Genuine and Spurious Interpretation (A Note on Pound's "Courts and Legislation"), 25 Green Bag 504, 507 (1913).
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"a fiction" and that the legislature itself "is fully aware that any but
the most explicit language is subject to the judicial power of interpretation.""'' John Chipman Gray believed the difference between common and statutory law to be exaggerated. "[S]tatutes do not interpret
themselves; their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with the
meaning declared by the courts, and no other meaning, that they are
imposed on the community as Law."' 2 Second, the Progressives believed that the classical system of statutory interpretation was unfairly
biased against legislation. Roscoe Pound, for one, decried "the indifference, if not contempt, with which [legislation] is regarded by courts
and lawyers""' and demonstrated how the maxim "statutes in derolaw should be strictly construed" manifested
gation of the 5common
4
that hostility.
In place of the traditional, antilegislative approach to statutes,
the Progressives offered analogical interpretation-statutes were to be
treated as active principles from which courts could reason by analogy. Pound put analogical interpretation at the top of his list of possible interpretive devices. 155 Appealing to the European practice of
interpreting codes analogically, Freund urged American courts "in
cases of genuine ambiguity" to "use the power of interpretation consciously and deliberately to promote sound law and sound principles
of legislation . . . [t]o be frankly and vigorously used as a legitimate
instrument of legal development and of balancing legislative inadvertance by judicial deliberation."' 56
Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 207, 231 (1917).
J.C. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law § 366, at 162 (1909) (emphasis omitted);
see Note, Statutory Principles in the Common Law, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 742, 744 (1917).
153 Pound, Common Law, supra note 105, at 383.
154 Id. at 386-87. Pound argued that the maxim
assumes that legislation is something to be deprecated. As no statute of any consequence dealing with any relation of private law can be anything but in derogation of the common law, the social reformer and the legal reformer, under this
doctrine, must always face the situation that the legislative act which represents
the fruit of their labors will find no sympathy in those who apply it, will be construed strictly, and will be made to interfere with the status quo as little as possible.
Id. at 387. See supra, note 109.
155 Pound, Common Law, supra note 105, at 385. Pound saw analogical interpretation as
the way of the future: "IT]he course of legal development upon which we have entered already
must [eventually] lead us to adopt the method of [analogical interpretation]." Id. at 386.
156 Freund, supra note 151, at 231.
The idea of analogical interpretation surfaced in Supreme Court opinions. In Gooch v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 258 U.S. 22, 24 (1922), Justice Holmes wrote:
For although courts sometimes have been slow to extend the effect of statutes
modifying the common law beyond the direct operation of the words, it is obvious
that a statute may indicate a change in the policy of the law, although it expresses
that change only in the specific cases most likely to occur to the mind.
1s

152
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In light of their discontentment with the classical order, the
progressives might have been expected to seize immediately upon the
doctrine of equitable interpretation as an alternative to that regime.
Yet this did not occur-the Progressives generally distrusted equitable interpretation. Pound criticized the doctrine by attributing to it
an objective "to make, unmake, or remake [the law], and not merely
to discover" what the legislature intended.' 57
Two beliefs explain the Progressives' distrust of equity. The first
was their view of history, which attributed equitable interpretation to
a prelegislative era. Pound thought equitable interpretation was
"made necessary in formative periods by the paucity of principles,
feebleness of legislation, and rigidity of rules characteristic of archaic
law. . . . As legislation becomes stronger and more frequent, examples of this type of so-called interpretation will finally become less
common."'5 Gray agreed: "[W]hen legislation is rare, and can be
procured with difficulty, the judges will allow themselves a freedom in
interpreting statutes which they will not exercise when any ambiguous
or defective statute can easily be remodelled by the Legislature."'' 59
Thus the equity of a statute was wholly irrelevant to an age where, as
in the early twentieth century, legislation was frequently and easily
revised.'" A second belief contributing to the Progressives' rejection
of equitable interpretation was their perception that the doctrine acted only to narrow statutes. The most familiar incarnation of that
doctrine was as part of the "golden rule." Freund, for example,
grouped equitable interpretation and the approaches of Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States'6 ' and Riggs v. Palmer162 under the
heading of "restrictive interpretation," the reading of exceptions into
statutes. 16 As a narrower of statutes, the equity of a statute represented the very tendency the progressives condemned-the tendency
of judges to undercut legislation.
By 1934, however, proponents of analogical interpretation em157 Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 379, 382 (1907) (criticism of Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (discussed at text accompanying supra notes
135-138). But see Drake, The Sociological Interpretation of Law, 16 Mich. L. Rev. 599,
605-06 (1918) (equity of statute used as basis for the sociological method of interpretation of

law).
158 Pound, Spurious Interpretation, supra note 157, at 382.

159 Gray, supra note 152, § 385, at 172-73.
160 Cf. Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 Colum. L. Rev. 20, 24 (1905) ("Although we
may believe, on whatever grounds, in a resurrection of equity in the remote future, the present

is a period of law.").
161 143 U.S. 457 (1892); see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
162 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). See supra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
163 Freund, supra note 151, at 221-24; see Pound, Spurious Interpretation, supra note 157.
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braced the equity of a statute as a legitimate tool for statutory interpretation. Leading the way in this shift was James Landis. Like the
Progressives, he believed that courts should use statutes the same way
they use common law precedents. 164 He did not, however, share the
Progressives' perception of history and of the equity of a statute. Landis associated equitable interpretation with the age of statutes 6 and
believed its decline was not logical necessity but historical accident.166
Indeed, Landis thought history demonstrated that equitable interpretation was essential to statutory interpretation. "Obviously there is
something intrinsic in the attitude toward legislation that was once
phrased by reference to the equity of the statute, that cannot be exorcised from the law."'167 This belief, coupled with his trust of the contemporary judiciary, 61 permitted Landis to offer the equity of a
statute as a tool to interpret statutes. Following Landis, William Page
and Jerome Frank drew upon the equity of a statute as an 70antecedent
for analogical interpretation,

B.

69

as did subsequent courts.

The Legal Realists: Equity as An Example of the Vacuity of
Legal Concepts

In the 1930's and 1940's the so-called "Legal Realists"' 7' subjected the classical order to criticisms far more reaching than those
offered by the Progressives. Whereas the Progressives merely criticized selected classical rules as antilegislative, the Realists cast doubt
upon the entire classical edifice. They attacked conceptualism in
every form 172 and in particular questioned the legitimacy of the cornerstone of classical thought: the public/private distinction. Felix
164 Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 236 (1934) ("Instead of treating statutory materials in an isolated fashion, care and imagination in handling
them, such as is customary in dealing with judicial precedents, may produce fruitful results.").
165 Id. at 235 n.10 ("The real fact is ... that the concern of the judges from the fourteenth
to the sixteenth century is with statutes rather than 'common law.' ").
166 See id. at 217-18.
167 Id. at 219.
168 Id. at 233 ("Grammatical interpretation is giving way to functional construction. The
distrust of legislative intervention is subsiding with the important advances made in the
mechanics of law-making.").

169 See Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 175, 198-200; Slifka v.
Johnson, 161 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1947) (opinion per Frank, J.); see also Usatorre v. The
Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 439-43 (2d Cir. 1949) (extended discussion of equitable interpretation)
(opinion per Frank, J.).
170 3 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 60.05, at 39-40 (F. Horack ed.
1943) (collecting cases identifying equitable interpretation with analogical interpretation).
171 For a description of the Legal Realists, see W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist
Movement (1973).
172 See K. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 55-57 (1962); Fuller,
American Legal Realism, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429, 443-47 (193.4).
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Cohen, Morris Cohen, and Robert Hale argued that private law in73
volved the delegation of sovereign power.
The correlative attack with regard to statutes was Max Radin's
Statutory Interpretation.' 74 That article attacked the core of the classical theory of statutory interpretation-the notion of legislative intent.
Radin argued that the collective intent of a legislative assembly was
undiscoverable 75 and irrelevant to the judiciary's use of statutes,
since the legislators' "function is not to impose their will even within
limits on their fellow-citizens, but to 'pass statutes,' which is a fairly
precise operation."'' 76 Nor did Radin stop with legislative intent: he
attacked the entire maze of classical rules governing statutory construction. The plain meaning rule, which ostensibly foreclosed construction of statutes whose meaning was "plain," actually presumed
prior interpretation which had found the meaning "plain."' 177 The
choice between strict and liberal construction rested on amorphous
categories and did not address the question of how strictly or liberally
a statute should be read.

78

Maxims such as expressio unius' 79 and

generis s°

ejusdem
lacked foundation in logic and habits of speech.'
A similarly all-destructive strategy was adopted by Karl Llewellyn,
who organized all the canons of statutory construction into two op82
posing columns to demonstrate their essential manipulability.
The Realists used the equity of a statute to discredit the classical
system by demonstrating that the system did that which it most abhorred. If its approach to statutes did not essentially differ from equitable construction, the classical system was a failure. For instance,
Frank Horack argued that equitable interpretation was
173 F. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev.
809, 815-17 (1935); M. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 11-14 (1927); M.
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 585-92 (1933); see Hale, Force and the
State: A Comparision of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 149,

149-50 (1935); see also Horwitz, supra note 102, at 1426 (description of Legal Realist attack
on public/private distinction).
17, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Radin, Statutory Interpretation].
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 879-81.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Black's Law Dictionary 521 (5th ed. 1979).
180 Ejusdem generis means that general words following an enumeration of specific things
are limited to things in the classes specifically mentioned. Id. at 464.
181 Radin, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 174, at 873-75.
182 Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950); see Posner,
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 806.
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no more than a different form of expressing a search for the intent
of the legislature....
The purpose of showing the similarity or identity between equitable interpretation and interpretation according to the intent of
the legislature has not been so much for the purpose of showing the
harmless character of the former, though that is apparently its
character, as ii has been to show the unrestrained character of the
latter. To say that the one allows uncontrolled judicial exercise of
legislative power and the other makes the court servient to legislative intention places emphasis upon words and not facts ...
[T]he title does not alter the process, which is not so much the
searching for the intention of the legislators as it is administration
of the legislator's rule by the court, according to a semi-intuitive
sense of justice which will make the abstract rule amenable to the
juristic needs of the community.' 8 3
Earl Crawford took the same position:
[T]he courts still follow the same process [as they did in Blackstone's era] in the interpretation of statutes, although they may
generally disapprove [of] the doctrine of equitable construction. . . It would, therefore, seem that the doctrine of equitable
construction is no more susceptible to fatal criticism than many of
the other rules or principles of construction. Even though by name
the doctrine may be refused application, actually it is still used.
' . * [T]he entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great
general legislative intent in every piece of legislation." 4
C.

The Post-Realist Legal Process School: Equity as a Mediator
Between ClassicalFormalism and Judicial Legislation

Having discredited the classical legal system, the Realists sought
to propose a meaningful alternative. In so doing, they were caught in
a dilemma. On the one hand, they rejected classical doctrine as empty
conceptualism. On the other hand, they still believed that law differed
from politics. To solve their dilemma, they adopted a middle position-referring to concepts which were neither rigid nor arbitrary,
such as "neutral principles'"" and "reasoned elaboration."' 8 6
183 Horack, Statutory Interpretation-Light from Plowden's Reports, 19 Ky. L.J. 211,
224-25 (1931); see also 3 J. Sutherland, supra note 170, at 137 (equity of a statute "has made a
definite impression upon American jurisprudence").
184 E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes 298-99 (1940).
185 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principals of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1

(1959).
186

See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Applica-
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With regard to statutes, the post-Realist problem was to avoid
rigid rules while deferring to the legislature. To do so, the post-Realists affirmed a loose distinction between common and statutory law
and seized upon a variety of mediating metaphors which were simultaneously nonmechanical and apolitical. The "equity of a statute"
with its various manifestations provided a rich source of mediators.
Appropriately, the first scholar to begin the reconstruction of
statutory interpretation was the one who had played the leading role
in the destruction of the old order-Max Radin. In A Short Way with
Statutes he backed away from his earlier critique, admitting, "[M]y
statements were undoubtedly somewhat too sweeping."' 87 While not
abandoning his prior position, he now admitted that statutes were
fundamentally different from the common law:
Is [the] difference in the way in which the court feels constrained
by the sources from which it derives its law, a fundamental difference, or is it merely a difference of technique in the manner in
which the court seeks to rid itself of constraint? It seems more
likely to be fundamental. Not only would open disregard of a statute be an almost unthinkable act of defiance, but continuous and
demonstrable evasion of the statute would endanger the position of
the courts in our system. The people would be little concerned if
the common law is transformed into a wholly different systemthe civil law, for example. They might resent a systematic indifference to principles of natural justice, but would find it difficult to
show that these principles had been disregarded. But they would
undoubtedly react vigorously against systematic refusal of a court
to obey constitutional statutes and they would find it relatively
easy to make their resentment effective. It is idle, therefore, to regard statutes as merely one source of law for the court, coordinate
with common-law tradition and with natural justice, for the statute
has a stronger constraining effect on the judge than have the other
elements.' 88

He then proposed an approach to statutes which did not require probing into subjective "intent"' 89 but still deferred to the legislature.
This was to interpret statutes in accord with their objective
"purpose."

A statute [should be understood] as an instruction to administrators and courts to accomplish a definite result, usually the securing
or maintaining of recognized social, political, or economic valtion of Law (tent. ed. 1958); see also Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. Legal Stud. 351, 395-98
(1973) (description of "Third Way" between substantive rationality and rule application).
187 Radin, Short Way, supra note I, at 410.
188 Id. at 396-97.
189

Id. at 406.
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ues. . . . [W]e may call the statute a ground design, or a plan in
which the character and size of a structure are indicated, and in
which details are given only so far as they are necessary to assure
the erection of the desired structure. 19°
Radin also backed away from his other criticisms. Even if not binding, the traditional rules were useful guides. Legislative materials, for
example, were "neither irrelevant nor incompetent, but. . . are in no
sense controlling."''
Likewise, the canons of interpretation were
transformed from rules into suggestions.
[W]hat room is there for the standard "canons of interpretations,"
for ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and the entire coterie or band
of phrases and tags and shibboleths which are so wearisomely familiar? I should be tempted to deny that they have ever resolved
an honest doubt, if a general negative were provable. Certainly it is
hard to find an instance in which they did more than invest with
the appropriate symbolic uniform a conclusion that should have
been quite as respectable in the ordinary civilian clothes of sober
common sense.
Evidently, "canons of interpretation" cannot always be rejected. There are statutes whose purpose is exhausted in the statute itself. . . . All that [they] envisageo is clarity. And
if ejusdem
192
generis can make it clear, by all means let us use it.
Weakening the classical system, however, left Radin without a
positive principle to guide courts toward legislative purpose. In
search of such a principle, he settled upon the mischief rule of Heydon's Case,' 93 adapted to meet contemporary circumstances. 194
"[T]he court today explores the mischief in order to discover, first, the
nature of the structure which the administrators are to erect and, second, how much of the existing social structure is to be saved in the
process.'" 9 5 That "rule" was sufficiently loose as not to be subject to
the Realist critique of rules but guided the court in a way which
would defer to the legislature. While not decreeing that statutes in
derogation of the common law be narrowly construed, the rule directed courts to look to the common law. While not leading judges on
a vain search for legislative intent, it told them to examine the mischief and remedy of the law. In short, it resolved the traditional di19 6
lemma between form and substance.
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. at 407.
Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 423.
3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584); see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Radin, Short Way, supra note 1, at 388-89, 421-22.
Id. at 421.
See id. at 405, 420.
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Radin's approach gained widespread acceptance among academics in the 1940's and 1950's. Felix Frankfurter, too, focused on statutory purpose:
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply
an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of
government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out
of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute,
as read in the
197
light of other external manifestations of purpose.
Sharing Radin's ambivalent attitude towards the canons of interpretation,' 9 8 he too rejected the classical system, which he associated with
English law, and offered Heydon's Case as a more realistic approach:
Th[e] current English rules of construction are simple. They
are too simple. If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment
of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded.
The rigidity of English courts in interpreting language merely by
reading it disregards the fact that enactments are, as it were, organisms which exist in their environment. One wonders whether
English judges are confined psychologically as they purport to be
legally. The judges deem themselves limited to reading the words
of a statute. But can they really escape placing the words in context of their minds, which after all are not automata applying legal
logic but repositories of all sorts of assumptions and impressions?
Such a modest if not mechanical view of the task of construction
disregards legal history. In earlier centuries the judges recognized
that the exercise of their judicial function to understand and apply
legislative policy is not to be hindered by artificial canons and limitations. The well known resolutions in Heydon's Case, have the
flavor of Elizabethan English but they express the substance of a
current volume of U.S. Reports as to the considerations relevant to
statutory interpretation. 99
197 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527,
538-39 (1947).
198
Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience, they all
have worth. In the abstract, they rarely arouse controversy. Difficulties emerge
when canons compete in soliciting judgment, because they conflict rather than
converge. For the demands of judgment underlying the art of interpretation, there
is no vade-mecum.
But even generalized restatements from time to time may not be wholly
wasteful. Out of them may come a sharper rephrasing of the conscious factors of
interpretation; new instances may make them more vivid but also disclose more
clearly their limitations. Thereby we may avoid rigidities which, while they afford
more precise formulas, do so at the price of cramping the life of law.
Id. at 544-45.
199 Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). Similar post-Realist formulations were offered by Karl
Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. Llewellyn praised the "Grand Style" of interpretation which
had predominated from 1820-1850, Llewellyn, supra note 182, at 396, 400, and his draft of the
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The pinnacle post-Realist work was Hart and Sacks' The Legal
Process.2 "° In that set of materials, the task begun by Radin reached
its fullest elaboration. Conceiving of law both as a single system and
as divided among the branches of government, Hart and Sacks believed in a separation of powers based on institutional competence
rather than on mechanical formulae.2" With respect to statutes, they
believed in tailored decisionmaking which focused on the particularities of the case and the policies underlying the rules rather than blind
adherence to traditional maxims.2"2 The classical canons were converted from controlling rules into discretionary factors. Legislative
intent was replaced by statutory purpose,2 0 3 discernible through discretionary use of legislative and postenactment history. 2" The plain
meaning rule2°5 was replaced with the use of words as "guides" and
construc"limits" in the attribution of purpose. 2" Rules of strict
20 8
tion 20 7 were replaced with policies of "clear statement.

Hart and Sacks prescribed a technique to guide courts through
these admonitions. First, they proposed a presumption reminiscent of
the rule of common reason: the court "should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. ' 2°9 Next,
they employed the rule of Heydon's Case:
The court should then proceed to do, in substance, just what Lord
Coke said it should do in Heydon's Case. The gist of this approach
Uniform Commercial Code required liberal interpretation in accordance with its purpose.
U.C.C. § 1-102(l) (1978). Jerome Frank affirmed a diminished distinction between common
and statutory law:
When judges modify a common-law rule, by expansion or contraction, they continue [the] process of legislation. They do so also when they apply such a rule to a
set of facts of a kind to which that rule has not previously been applied. That
holds true when the rule was enacted by the legislature. For, in so doing, they
interpret the statute-and interpretation is inescapably a kind of legislation. To be
sure, as, in such circumstances, legislative legislation and judicial legislation interact, the latter should be more restricted than when judges interpret common law
rules.
Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
1259, 1269 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
200 H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 186.
201 See id. at 180-83 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 489, 489-91 (1954)).
202 See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 186, at 185-86.
203 Id. at 1410, 1413-14.
204 Id. at 1415-16.
205 See id. at 1148-78.
206 See id. at 1411-12.
207 Id. at 1229-41.
208 Id. at 1412-13.
209 Id. at 1415.
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is to infer purpose by comparing the new law with the old. Why
would reasonable men, confronted with the law as it was, have enacted this new law to replace it? Answering this question, as Lord
Coke said, calls for a close look at the "mischief" thought to inhere
in the old law and2 10at "the true reason of the remedy" provided by
the statute for it.
Hart and Sacks' views are now dominant. Since the Second
World War, courts have invoked the "equity of a statute" 2 1' and the
rule of Heydon's Case2 12 with increasing frequency. The latest academic representative of their approach is James Willard Hurst. By
making a historical comparison, Hurst aptly encapsulates the legal
process rhetoric. He praises it as "pragmatic" and "deferential," because its
emphasis is on coming to a specific focus on a given statute in its
full-dimensioned particularity of policy, rather than emphasizing
material or values not immediately connected to that enactment.
Courts now seem usually to strive to grasp the distinctive message
of statutory words, taken in their own context, with reference to
the documented process that produced that particular act, including legislative history deserving credibility, and policy guides supplied by the legislature's successive development of the given policy
area and related areas. The twentieth-century emphasis thus is not
on broad, standardized formulas, but on custom-built determinations, fashioned1out
of materials immediate and special to the legis2 3
lation at issue.
Hurst contrasts this emphasis with that of the previous century:
[N]ineteenth-century decisions were likely to treat a statute as an
isolated item. .

.

. From about 1820 to 1890 the growth of com-

mon law captured the ambition and imagination of judges and
legal writers to the extent that they tended to identify this section
as the true law compared with which legislation was marginal, exceptional, and indeed intrusive. They often expressed this attitude
in unsympathetic reading of statutes, especially by invoking canons
of construction which by their vagueness and
diversity enlarged
2 14
the judges' own freedom of choosing policy.
Hurst finds the classical bias against legislation reflected in "the abstract character of [nineteenth-century] rules of construction [which
210 Id. at 1415 (citation omitted).
211 As of October 21, 1985, a LEXIS search indicates that after not being cited from
1925-1939, the equity of a statute has been invoked in 13 federal cases.
212 As of October 21, 1985, a LEXIS search indicates that after not being cited from
1925-1942, Heydon's Case has been cited in 28 federal cases.
213 J Hurst, Dealing with Statutes 65 (1982).
214 Id. at 41-42.
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made them] likely to veil unacknowledged value preferences which
may not stand close examination. ' "
Subsumed in Hearst's comparison is an appeal to "contextualization." Statutory purpose is sufficiently all-embracing to permit examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. This,
in turn, improves judicial decisionmaking. Freed from the classical
canons, courts reach more accurate decisions, state more candidly the
factors which influenced their decisions, and are more responsive to
the legislature.
V.

CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TOWARD STATUTES:
REEMERGENCE OF THE PATTERNS REFLECTED
IN PRIOR MEANINGS OF EQUITY

In the broadest terms, the history of statutory interpretation contains three basic patterns for coping with the problem of form versus
substance. The first, dominant during the Blackstonian and early
classical eras, acknowledged the duality at the higher, more abstract
level of the relationship between common and statutory law, by using
dualities which paralleled form and substance, such as law and equity,
or technicality and liberality. Yet, while acknowledging this polarity,
Blackstonian and preclassical thinkers did not squarely confront the
fundamental choice between form and substance. Peculiar historical
concerns-rationalizing the English system of dual courts or eliminating vestiges of English law in America-diverted their attention.
The second pattern, prevalent during the classical era, settled
upon one mediating term to resolve the problem of form and substance: intent. Classical courts avoided the choice between form and
substance by deferring to the will of others, and, in the case of statutes, the other was the legislature. This resolution, however, simply
pushed down the problem of form and substance to the lower level of
interpretive rules. In divining legislative intent, courts were again
confronted with the choice between form, following the plain meaning
of the statute, and substance, deferring to its spirit.
The third pattern, evident in post-Realist Writings, followed the
classical pattern by settling upon a mediating term, but deviated from
that pattern by not pushing down the problem of form and substance
to the lower level. The post-Realist mediator, statutory purpose, resolved the choice between form and substance without requiring reconsideration of that choice later in the analysis. Simultaneously
nonmechanical and deferential, statutory purpose was sufficiently
213

Id. at 64.
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loose to permit courts to avoid discussion of the problem of form and
substance altogether.
The meaning of the equity of a statute varied with each of these
patterns. In the first pattern, it was associated with the substantive
side of the acknowledged duality. In the second and third, it was
equated with the mediating term and the substance side of any duality
reemerging on the lower, interpretive level.
The above three patterns go far towards explaining contemporary views of statutes. Developments in the last twenty years suggest
that the field of statutory interpretation is in the midst of transition:
that the post-Realist approach, preeminent for the past thirty years, is
on the wane, and that the Blackstonian, preclassical, and classical patterns are reemerging in its stead. Thus, all the patterns reflected in
the meanings of equity over the past two centuries are present in contemporary discourse.
A.

Decline of the Post-RealistApproach

1. Apparent Continuity with the Legal Process Approach
At first glance, the legal process approach appears hale and
hearty. Indeed, two recent writers on statutes, Richard Posner 21 6 and
Guido Calabresi, 21 7" both adopt the legal process critique of the classi-

cal order, embrace statutory purpose as their governing principle, and
extol the virtues of contextualization. They desire to build on the
legal process foundations and propose only to refine it by broadening
its inquiry into statutory purpose to include new factors.
Posner's critique of the classical canons of interpretation closely
parallels that of Hart and Sacks. He finds those canons inaccurate
either because they are based upon misunderstandings of judicial behavior and the political process or because they impute omniscience
to Congress.2t 8 Like Hurst, Posner finds that the canons lead to dishonesty and betrayal of the legislative will.
Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the canons do not
constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to
create the appearance that his decisions are constrained. .

.

. By

making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than crea216 Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2; Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Posner, Reading of Statutes].
217 G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982); Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 247 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi,
Comment].
218 Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 811.
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tive, the canons conceal, often from the reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the writer, the extent to which the judge is
making new law in the guise of interpreting a statute or a constitutional provision. . . . The judge who recognizes the degree to
which he is free rather than constrained in the interpretation of
statutes, and who refuses to make a pretense of constraint by parading the canons of construction in his opinions, is less likely to
act wilfully than the judge who either mistakes freedom for constraint or has no compunctions about misrepresenting his will as
that of the Congress.2 19
Adopting the legal process critique, Posner sketches an approach
with admitted "obvious affinities" 22 0 with Hart and Sacks, with one
modification: courts should consider legislative compromise in ascertaining statutory purpose. "A court should not just assume that a
statute's apparent purpose is not its real purpose. But where the lines
of compromise are discernible, the judge's duty is to follow them, to
implement not the purposes of one group of legislators, but the compromise itself."' 22 1 Insight into the original compromise may be
gleaned from the values and attitudes of the period in which the statute was enacted and the legislative attitude regarding judicial
interpretation. 222
Calabresi, too, claims the legal process mantle and tries to
squeeze within the Hart and Sacks tradition. 22 a Acknowledging that
"[iln a deep sense we are all followers of Henry Hart and know the
moves almost by instinct, ' 224 Calabresi believes that legal process
style interpretation should be the normal judicial attitude towards
statutes,2 25 and proposes only to widen judicial inquiry to encompass

220

Id. at 816-17.
Id. at 819.

221

Id. at 820 (footnote omitted). Posner distinguishes his proposal from the legal process

219

approach:
Hart and Sacks appear to be suggesting that the judge should ignore interest
groups, popular ignorance and prejudices, and other things that deflect legislators
from the single-minded pursuit of the public interest as the judge would conceive
it. But to ignore these things runs the risk of attributing to legislation not the
purposes reasonably inferable from the legislation itself, but the judge's own conceptions of the public interest.
Id. at 819.
222

Id. at 818.

223

Calabresi depicts himself as restorer rather than revolutionary. G. Calabresi, supra note

217, at 2.
224

Id. at 87. Indeed, Calabresi has been described as a member of a new legal process

school. See Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 213, 239 (1983).
225 Calabresi agrees with Gerald Gunther that interpretation has "a meaning and function,"
G. Calabresi, supra note 217, at 19, and says that in the "many situations when the issue of
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one more consideration-whether the statute commands majority
support and fits into the legal landscape.226
In defending his proposal, Calabresi falls back on the legal process rhetoric of contextualization. By permitting courts to acknowledge openly that which already influences their decisions covertly, his
'
alternative constitutes "The Choice for Candor."227
"[W]e are already doing, badly and in hidden ways, much of what this 'radical'
doctrine allows. Indeed, an open use of the proposal may well prove
to be less dangerous-less prone to unrestrained judicial activismthan today's use of complex subterfuges. ' 228 Foremost among these
subterfuges is holding a statute unconstitutional simply because it is
obsolete. 229 By shifting the grounds of such decisions from rarely
amended constitution to easily revised statute, Calabresi hopes to promote accurate, honest, and democratic decisionmaking.
2. The Actual Weakness of the Legal Process Approach
On closer examination, however, the legal process approach is
losing appeal. The linchpin of that approach-statutory purpose-is
becoming meaningless. Disenchantment with the legislative process
has become rampant, and the statutes emerging from that process are
viewed as flawed, compromised, and lacking in meaning.
The diagnoses of the ailments of the legislative process vary. One
theory is that that process has been taken over by special interest
groups. Consequently, statutes can only compromise among competing viewpoints. The Supreme Court describes statutes as constituting
"compromise[s] between. . . competing interests" 230 and as compromise "measures" conciliating social and economic conflicts. 231 As
such, statutes cannot embody transcendent purposes. Richard Posner
and Frank Easterbrook both believe that "many statutes are the produpdating is not present,. . . the proper function for the court is to find out and apply what the
legislators wanted, 'free from ulterior purposes,' " id. at 43. See also id. at 132 (mention of
"true interpretation").
226 "The first task of courts in all instances remains to look to the landscape, to legal principles. If the statute can be said to fit, that settles the issue. If it does not, the guess, increasingly
made at common law, as to majoritarian wishes will inevitably be made." Id. at 113.
227 Id. at 178-81.
228 Id. at 7.
229 See id. at 8-15. Calabresi also argues that judges have manipulated both constitutional

law and the rules of statutory interpretation in attempts to update obsolete statutes. Id. at
21-43.
230 Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 449 U.S.
268, 282 (1980) (referring to workman's compensation statutes).
231 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-91 (1980) (citation omitted). The Court has
also described statutes as striking a balance between opposing views. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447
U.S. 352, 375 n.28 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978).
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uct of compromise between opposing groups and. . . a compromise
232
is quite likely not to embody a single consistent purpose.t
A second diagnosis focuses on the problem of legislative inertia.
Justice Stevens, for instance, describes the Court as "properly concerned" about "the quality of the work product of Congress, and the
sheer bulk of new federal legislation. ' 233 Academic circles, too, perceive a widespread legislative paralysis blocking needed statutory revision. Calabresi observes the "problem of legal obsolescence," which is
234
rooted in the fact that "a statute is hard to revise once it is passed.
Grant Gilmore describes legislative inertia, traceable to the massive
increase in legislation during the twentieth century, the difficulty of
drawing the attention of a crisis-ridden Congress to law reform, and
the New Deal style of drafting. 23 5 Jack Davies sees ill-drafted statutes
which have resulted from legislative inability to provide for every pos236
sible future contingency.
This loss of faith in the legislative process bodes ill for the legal
process approach. Try as they might to frame their proposals as mere
modifications of the legal process model, Posner and Calabresi cannot
simply adjust that model without faith in its guiding force, statutory
purpose. Indeed, this is evident in Posner and Calabresi's failure to
circumscribe their proposals-they cannot state how many statutes
are compromises or are obsolete. Thus their extenuating circumstances threaten to swallow the legal process rule that statutory purpose governs.
B.

The Emergence of New Approaches to Statutes

Without statutory purpose, courts must once again grapple with
the problem of form and substance. In doing so, they have adopted
rhetoric reminiscent of past eras. Although differing in terminology
232 Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 819; see Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540-41 (1983) ("[A]lmost all statutes" are compromises, and
"[m]ost compromises lack 'spirit.' ").
233 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 G. Calabresi, supra note 217, at 2. Calabresi notes that obsolescence results in "the
feeling that . . . laws are governing us that would not and could not be enacted today, and
that some of these laws not only could not be reenacted but also do not fit, are in some sense
inconsistent with, our whole legal landscape." Id.
235 G. Gilmore, supra note 102; see Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies In Context, 4 Vt. L.
Rev. 233 (1979).
236 Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 Vt.
L. Rev. 203, 210-11 (1979). See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892 (1982).
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and detail, the emerging alternatives echo preclassical and classical
patterns of thought.
1. Legislative Compromise and Classical Thought
One response to the renewed problem of form and substance is to
defer to the original legislative compromise embodied in statutory language. Under this approach, extrinsic material and policy concerns
assume less significance: Material outside the statute becomes suspect
for not having passed the scrutiny of a majority of legislators., Resort
to policy becomes fruitless since statutes compromise between conflicting policies.
This "legislative compromise" response is evident in judicial decisions and in scholarly articles. Implicit in the literalist tone of decisions refusing to imply private causes of action,237 this response is
fully articulated in several Supreme Court opinions. When confronted by a statute reflecting the "countervailing" purposes of "tempestuous legislative proceedings" in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, the
Court announced: "We must respect the compromise embodied in the
words chosen by Congress."23 While sustaining a statute against a
due process challenge in another case, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had "lost a political battle," that Congress must be assumed to
have intended what it enacted, and that its judgments were to be
respected, particularly when drawing lines classifying persons for benefits. 239 The appeal of the legislative compromise rule is not limited to
a few Supreme Court opinions. Posner and Easterbrook both affirmatively advocate it24 and Calabresi and Davies are both swayed by its
force.24
This "legislative compromise" approach is the intellectual heir to
237 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1981) (" '[I1t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others
into it.' ") (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979));
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (absence of reference to cause of
action in legislative history renders unnecessary consideration of factors such as identity of
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, overall legislative scheme, and traditional role
of states in providing relief); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (reliance on expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
238 447 U.S. 807, 818, 826 (1980). See Note, supra note 236, at 899-907.
239 United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
240 See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, supra note 232, at 540-44; Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 819-20.
24I Davies would preserve living compromises by limiting judicial revision to statutes over
20 years of age. Davies, supra note 236, at 226. Although dispensing with a bright line, Calabresi recognizes the need to balance "consistency" in the law against "majoritarian demands
for distinctions." Calabresi, Comment, supra note 217, at 253-54.
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the classical order. Legislative compromise summons up the aura of
deference surrounding terms like legislative intent. Under both approaches, courts do not legislate; they simply implement the decisions
of others. Therefore, like legislative intent, legislative compromise is
correlated with a renewed interest in the public/private distinction.
Indeed, recent scholars draw upon that distinction and extend it by
classifying statutes along a public/private continuum.2 4 2
Also like legislative intent, legislative compromise pushes the
problem of form and substance down one level. Once the discussion
turns to how to ascertain legislative compromise, judges inevitably
disagree as to whether to follow the letter or spirit of the law. A
dramatic example of this disagreement is the dispute between Posner
and Easterbrook.
Posner espouses "imaginative reconstruction" as the proper
means for ascertaining legislative compromise,24 3 a position reminiscent of the classical intent resolution to the problem of literal and
nonliteral interpretation. "The judge should try to think his way as
best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how
they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar." 2 In
doing so, Posner criticizes "strict constructionism," as overtly
political.245
In contrast, Easterbrook thinks the best way to ascertain legislative compromise is to impose a duty of "clear statement" upon the
legislature: "Unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, the remainder of the statute
should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly
resolved in the legislative process. ' 24 6 This clear statement approach
echoes the plain meaning rule. Like that rule, it is defended by reference to the need for deference to the legislature under separation of
powers principles. Easterbrook asserts that legislatures do not generally designate a mere purpose-they also designate the means to
achieve that purpose and that judicial displacement of that means
defeats the original legislative plan.24 7
242 E.g., Davies, supra note 236, at 204 n.7 (distinction between public and private statutes
in proposed act); Easterbrook, Forward, supra note 4, at 15-16; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, supra note 232, at 541 n. 10; Posner, Reading of Statutes, supra note 216, at 269-72.
243 Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 817.
244 Id.

245 Posner states: "To construe a statute strictly is to limit its scope and its life span-to
make Congress work twice as hard to produce the same effect." Id. at 821-22.
246 Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, supra note 232, at 544.
247 Id. at 545-47.
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2.

Judicial Revisionism and Preclassical Thought

The other response to. the renewed problem of form and substance is to utilize that duality in.judicial decisionmaking. Once pri-

macy is assigned to that duality, all judicial decisionmaking whether
it consists of statutory interpretation or common law adjudication,
becomes essentially similar. Consequently, courts acknowledging the

problem of form and substance are freer to look to outside materials,
such as other statutes, the common law, and contemporary morals, in
interpreting statutes.

This response, which may be described as judicial revisionism, is
evident in judicial opinions. It underlies the implied-right-of-action

cases of the 1960's, in which the Supreme Court used common law
principles to fashion judicial remedies.2 4 It is more pronounced in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,2 49 where, after observing that
numerous intervening legislative enactments had made wrongful

death remedies part of the common law, the Court permitted a
wrongful death action under a statute which had long been read to
bar such action.25 ° Judicial revisionism is, however,: most obvious
when courts refuse to follow statutes. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 25 ' exemplifies such a refusal. In that case, the California Supreme Court held

that in enacting the Civil Code the state legislature had intended to
adopt contributory negligence, but that the rule of liberal construc-

tion, coupled with the Code's character as a continuation of the common law, permitted judicial adoption of comparative negligence
pursuant to developing tort theory.25 2
Judicial revisionism has also surfaced in academic writings. Gil248 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967) ("we do not
believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Government a remedy that ensures the
full effectiveness of the Act."); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("It is for the
federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' where federally
secured rights are invaded.") (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
249 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
250 Id. at 393. For an additional discussion of Moragne, see Note, The Legitimacy of Civil
Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 Yale L.J. 258, 260-63
(1972).
For a recent instance in which the Court looked to other statutes to give meaning to the
statute before it, see Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984), where the Court looked to the
Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1441 (1982), to conclude that the
plaintiffs before it were not entitled to attorney fees under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982). In so holding, the Court slipped away from legislative purpose to the
requirements of rationality and fidelity to legislative compromise. "[Wle cannot believe that
Congress intended to have the careful balance struck in the [Education of the Handicapped
Act] upset by reliance on [the Rehabilitation Act]." 104 S. Ct. at 3474.
251 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
252 Id. at 821-22, 532 P.2d at 1238-39, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
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more believes that "courts, faced with an obsolete statute and a history of legislative inaction, may take matters into their own hands and
'
do whatever justice and good sense may seem to require."253
Davies
would grant courts the power to modify and overrule certain statutes
in the way they modify and overrule principles and precedents of the
common law." 4 Calabresi would permit courts to update statutes by
looking to "the legal landscape," e.g., other statutes and the common
law, and by considering majoritarian preferences. 2 " Posner and Easterbrook acknowledge something akin to judicial revision 25
in6their recognition that the Sherman Act deserves a broad reading.
Judicial revisionism harkens back to Blackstonian and preclassical structures.2"7 Like those structures, it posits the existence of techniques of reasoning transcending the distinction between common
and statutory law. Striking signposts of its lineage are Calabresi's admiration for the equity of a statute258 and the California Supreme
Court opinion in Li, where Field's notion of a liberally construed
Code which also continued the common law-dead since the attacks
of Pomeroy-was revived after a hundred years.259
G. Gilmore, supra note 235, at 97.
Davies, supra note 236, at 204 n.7.
G. Calabresi, supra note 217, at 121. For an academic urging courts to look beyond the
statutes but not fully embracing the revisionist position, see Williams, Statutes as Sources of
Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 554 (1982).
256 See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, supra note 232, at 544; Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 818.
257 Calabresi claims adherence to the "ideal" judicial legislative balance present in the late
19th century:
The principal instruments of this system were the common law courts, for most
law was court-made. . . . [T]he law could normally be updated without dramatic
breaks through common law adjudication and revision of precedents. Change occurred because the doctrine of stare decisis was adhered to in a relatively loose
fashion and precedents were not, even nominally, ultimately binding. The changes
that did occur tended to be piecemeal and incremental, organic if one wishes, as
courts sought to discover and only incidentally to make the ever-changing law.
Calabresi, supra note 217, at 4 (footnotes omitted).
But the late 19th century balance between legislature and judiciary was the product of a
very different legal universe than that imagined by Calabresi. The late classical era perceived a
vast gulf between common and statutory law, a gulf which Calabresi denies. The true antecedents of Calabresi's approach-antecedents which likewise deny the supremacy of legislative
will-lie in Blackstonian and preclassical systems.
258 See G. Calabresi, supra note 217, at 85-86; see also id. at 82, stating:
Let us suppose that common law courts have the power to treat statutes in precisely the same way that they treat the common law. They can (without resort to
constitutions or passive virtues or strained interpretations) alter a written law or
some part of it in the same way (and with the same reluctance) in which they can
modify or abandon a common law doctrine or even a whole complex set of interrelated doctrines.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
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The resemblance to preclassical thought does not stop there. Judicial revisionism alleviates the tension between form and substance
in a manner reminiscent of preclassical eras by focusing in on a particular, manageable, historical problem-that of obsolete statutes. The
choice between form and substance is not so stark when one considers
the core cases of "obviously" obsolete statutes, such as those prohibiting the sale of contraceptive devices or severely limiting recovery in
workers'-compensation suits.26
Also like preclassical approaches, judicial revisionism would organize the rules of interpretation along the division between form and
substance. Just as preclassical jurists divided statutes into categories
receiving liberal or strict interpretation, so also Calabresi divides all
statutes into those deserving revisionist or retentionist biases. 26 1 As in
preclassical times, the problem of form and substance is more difficult
at this level, requiring consideration of a broad array of factors such
as whether the statute was passed in response to a particular crisis,
whether it has continuing support in the general circumstances of enactment, and whether it reorganizes a whole area of law.
CONCLUSION

Thus, the history of statutory interpretation is one of constant
but shifting patterns. In summarizing this Article, it is useful to consider how this narrative bears upon common assumptions about legal
thought and history. First, it is commonly assumed that formalism is
generally adopted by those favoring a free market while substantive
arguments are favored by those sympathetic to regulation.262 The alliances between form and laissez faire and between substance and regulation are, however, at best uneasy ones. As this history has
illustrated, proponents of regulation sometimes adopt formal rules,
and advocates of laissez faire sometimes embrace informality. Thus,
the Progressives of the early twentieth century refused to embrace the
equity of the statute despite their attraction to state intervention,
while a proponent of the free market such as Richard Posner prefers a
looser, nonliteral approach over a "clear statement" rule.
Another common assumption is that legal systems are "tilted" to
260 It is consequently not surprising that Calabresi's critics often doubt that many statutes

qualify as "clearly" obsolete. E.g., Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A New Role for
Courts? (Book Review), 91 Yale L.J. 836-37 (1982); Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido
Calabresi's Uncommon Law for a Statutory Age (Review Essay), 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126,
1169 (1982).
261 G. Calabresi, supra note 217, at 133-34.
262 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 3, at 1737-51; Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 821-22.
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achieve particular results.263 In particular, the classical order is often
characterized as biased against legislation. 26 The history of statutory
interpretation suggests some basis for this assumption. Discrete rules,
though apparently neutral, may not be so when considered in the context of an entire system. For example, the so-called "golden rule,"
despite its balanced appearance, served solely to narrow statutes.
Closer examination indicates, however, that the classical system
did not, as a matter of logical necessity, produce antilegislative results. Viewed systemically, its rules were neutral-each rule had a
balancing counterrule. Indeed, this is natural, since as a system of
broad application, the classical regime was used both to extend and to
restrict statutes. Within the classical system, the intent and plain
meaning resolutions balanced one another and were both facially neutral, not distinguishing between exceptions to and extensions of statutes. Nor did the late classical polarization of common and statutory
law necessarily reduce the role of statutes. The distance between statutes and the common law could have put the former in an exalted
position, read broadly and insulated from judicial interference. Similarly, the preclassical poles of strict and liberal interpretation which
survived into the classical era balanced antilegislative and prolegislative canons. Statutes in derogation of the common law were read
strictly; remedial statutes were read liberally.265
A third common assumption is that certain doctrinal systems are
more intellectually honest than others. Thus, classical judges are
sometimes described as being less forthright about the factors influencing their opinions than preclassical judges.2 66 The history of statutory interpretation casts doubt upon this assumption. Admittedly,
the form and substance duality received a primacy in the preclassical
era which it subsequently lacked. Yet, even assuming that the form
and substance choice is inherent to legal thought and not simply the
See, e.g., Holt, Tilt, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 280 (1984).
264 See J. Hurst, supra note 213, at 11-12; Pound, Common Law, supra note 105, at 386.
265 The claim of classical "bias" might be comparative-that the legal process approach is
more favorably disposed toward legislation than the classical order. Yet, this cannot be the
case. Whatever bias existed in the classical rules also existed in the legal process method. The
legal process school merely "loosened up" both the pro- and antilegislative classical rules,
without altering their tilt. The legal process options of imposing a duty of clear statement or
relying on words as guides and limits, were balanced no differently than the classical choice of
intent or plain meaning or the preclassical choice of strict or liberal interpretation. Nor did the
legal process use of particularistic methods, such as examination of legislative history or consideration of policy, consistently extend statutes.
266 See, e.g., J. Hurst, supra note 213, at 64-65; K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition
64-73 (1960) (comparision of Grand and Formal styles); id. at 382-83 (description of application of those styles to statutes); Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 816-17.
263
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product of modem consciousness, preclassical doctrine may not have
been more forthright than classical theory. In neither system was the
duality of form and substance given its "due." The classical order
avoided this choice by pointing to legislative intent; the preclassical,
by focusing on particular cases in which the problem did not occur.
The failure to focus on the choice between form and substance is
not surprising when one recalls the problematic nature of that choice.
Human beings naturally flinch when confronted by that which defies
logical explanation. After all, not even Moses could look at the face
of God.267
267

Exodus 33:20.

